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 SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES (STECF) 
 
Management plans part 2 - changes to cod management plans (STECF-12-13) 
THIS REPORT WAS REVIEWED DURING THE PLENARY MEETING HELD IN 
COPENHAGEN, DENMARK, 9-13 JULY 2012 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Next to preparing for the development of multi-stock plans, the Commission is considering proposing 
possible improvements of the cod plan1 with regards to the implementation problems identified by 
STECF2.  
STECF is therefore requested to advice on possible options for amending the cod plan built on the 
advice already provided in the spring plenary report3. 
 
Request to the STECF 
 
STECF is requested to review the reports of the STECF Expert Working Group (EWG-12-07), 
evaluate the findings and make any appropriate comments and recommendations. 
 
 
STECF observations and conclusions 
 
STECF has reviewed the report and makes the following observations and conclusions for the 
headings below.  
 
Review of proposed changes of the current cod plan  
 
Previous to the meeting the Commission provided the working group with proposed changes to article 
9, 11, 12 and 14 of the current cod plan (EG) 1224/2008. 
 
Article 9 
 
                                                 
1Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those 
stocks 
2 EWG report on the "Evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scotland 
(STECF-11-07)" 
3 39th Plenary meeting report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-12-01), 16-20 
April 2012 
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STECF notes the need for alternative advice if assessments are not available. Methods for Kattegat cod 
and Irish Sea cod are provided by the working group.  
 
Article 11 
 
• STECF supports the removal of derogations merely based on catch compositions as they could occur 
because of cod depletion.  
 
• STECF supports the recommendation to approve exemptions for fishing activity outside the 
distribution area of cod and/or fishing with gear that minimizes cod catches. 
 
• STECF considered that using the percentage of cod in the total catch as an exemption criterion is 
flawed, because even when percentages of cod in the catch are low, these catches can still contribute 
significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when cod abundance is low. 
STECF notes that table 6.1 of EWG 12-XY provides a clear overview of the pros and cons of different 
options of replacing the 1.5 % exemption criterion in the current regulation. 
 
• STECF considers that it might be useful for STECF to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, practices 
other than gear- and area based measures demonstrating actual decoupling. 
 
• STECF notes that the proposed amendment does not include any requirement for monitoring whether 
the catches in the exempted areas and by the exempted gear remain low. STECF recommends that a 
requirement for periodical monitoring be added such that it can be verified whether the levels of cod 
catches of exempted vessels still conform to the criteria for entering the exemption and whether these 
levels do not oppose the plan’s aim to reduce mortality on cod.  
 
• STECF notes that the enforcement and implementation of the proposed Article 11a1(a) concerning a 
depth requirements could be problematic due to position reporting requirements and considers that 
exempted vessels could be required to report exact position, depth, and duration of each haul in 
logbooks to the control authorities. Intervals between VMS transmissions should also be increased to 
at least 30 minutes. To provide verification MS should submit raw data on logbook, depth, and VMS 
from the entire fishing trip. STECF notes that adding these requirements will result in additional 
control costs by adding another layer and additional data to the administrative control. The fishing 
industry would also increase their cost in transmitting VMS data. STECF recommends that the full 
costs of introducing these measures and their associated benefits are fully explored before amending 
the regulation.  
 
• STECF notes that the enforcement and implementation of the proposed Article 11a1(b) concerning 
gear requirements could be problematic due to the requirement to specify in detail how the gear is to 
be used. Moreover, in common with all gear-based regulation, it is difficult to define accurately in an 
effective way, and it is essential to verify through monitoring effectiveness in practice. Furthermore, 
although a gear may reduce overall cod catches by XX% it may actually increase cod catches of 
certain (e.g. young) age classes; selectivity is length-dependent and thus reduction is demography-
dependent. 
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Article 12 
 
In the wording in the proposed change to the cod plan it is not clear what differentiates the conditions 
for Articles 9.1 and 9.2, upon which Article 12 depends. Discussions with the Commission suggest 
there is a clear distinction in mind but this is not expressed in the current draft. Perhaps there is a need 
to clearly define the different levels of scientific advice alluded to in the draft regulation text 
(i.e.insufficient information to set the TACs). 
 
 
Article 13 
 
STECF has repeatedly underlined the difficulty for stakeholders to comply with and for STECF to 
evaluate article 13 requirements stating that cod avoidance measures must be demonstrated to deliver 
at least as much reduction in fishing mortality than otherwise would result from effort reduction.  
Fishing mortality is a fairly abstract concept that the industry cannot monitor and manage directly, and 
which does not have proportional relationship to catches. The EWG-12-07 report ‘changes to cod 
plans’ section 6.5 proposes a method based on catch that could be used instead of the F-based 
approach to demonstrate conformity with the regulation. 
 
Article 14  
 
The implementation of the new article 14.6 could be problematic. It states that MS shall take 
immediate measures to minimize discards if the quota allocation does not correspond to the expected 
catches. There are a number of different measures that can be considered immediate measures and it is 
important that these do not create perverse incentives. For example, the way the proposal is written it 
could read that one possible measure could be to reallocate quota towards fisheries with high cod by-
catches.  
 
 
Evaluation of a range management approaches from compliance and industry perspective.  
 
In addition to the ToRs the working group explored the management measures suggested by the 
STECF (EWG 11-15) from an enforcement and fishermen perspective. 
 
The management options selected as the most favourable for enforcement (catch quota system) is the 
one least favoured by the fishermen responding to the questionnaire.  This difference can be partially 
explained through the choice of survey instrument.  An on-line questionnaire is not the most 
appropriate approach to gathering feedback on complex management options, as it is difficult to 
explain the operation of the management option, and not possible to know if the respondent has 
completely understood all the details.  The evidence from the survey suggests that respondents were 
most concerned about the suggested limit on fishing once one quota had been exhausted. Fishers 
appear to prefer the current system with landings restrictions which scientist advise will not limit 
fishing mortality. The results do suggest general support for CCTV and fully documented fisheries.   
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Inevitably, there are varying and divergent views on appropriate and desired management options 
given the variety of stakeholders and subgroups existing within the fisheries (e.g., varying fleets within 
and across MS, enforcers, managers, scientists). The two studies of the enforcement implications and 
industry views of management options highlight these divergent views clearly.  Though the research 
behind each was preliminary and of a pilot-project standard, the results were indicative of the reality of 
divergent views held on potential management options.   The views of both enforcement agencies and 
fishers must be taken into account when designing long-term management regimes.  Ideally, the 
control measures should be efficient and reliable as well as easily understood and supported by the 
fishing industry.  
 
The study results should be seen as very preliminary. STECF notes that in order to conduct a more 
complete study funding under an ad-hoc contract is not sufficient. 
 
 
 
STECF recommendations 
 
STECF has not specific recommendations drawn from this report.  
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EXPERT WORKING GROUP  EWG-12-07 REPORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REPORT TO THE STECF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON  
Management plans part 2 - changes to cod plans  
(EWG -12-07) 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh, Scotland, 18-22 June 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
This report does not necessarily reflect the view of the STECF and the European 
Commission and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The STECF Expert Working Group (EWG 12-07) on Management plans pt2 developing area 
based management plans met in Edinburgh, Scotland from 18 to 22 of June 2012. The EWG 
considered aspects of the organisation of area based management plans, the boundaries 
between areas, the resources, timetables and biological and economic modelling needs. The 
report on this aspect is contained in STECF-12-14; this report considers management aspects 
relating to the revision of management plans.   
The EWG considered evaluation of a range of management approaches from compliance and 
industry perspectives. The studies are preliminary but indicate rather divergent views on the 
best solutions. 
In the review of the proposed changes to the cod plan the following were noted: 
Article 9: There is a need for alternative advice if assessments are not available; methods for 
Kattegat cod and Irish Sea cod are provided. 
Article 11: The EWG supports the use of derogations for fisheries that do not catch significant 
proportions of cod and the removal of derogations that exist only when they occur because of 
cod depletion. The EWG considered that using the percentage of cod in the total catch as an 
exemption criterionis flawed, because even when percentages of cod in the catch are low, these 
catches can still contribute significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high 
or when cod abundance is low. EWG provides a list of options with pros and cons (Table 6.2). 
The EWG noted a requirement for periodic monitoring be added to the regulation such that it 
can be verified whether the levels of cod catches of exempted vessels still conform to the 
criteria for entering the exemption.  
Article 12: The EWG found the proposed amendments are unclear and difficult to follow. It is 
not clear what differentiates Articles 9.1 and 9.2, upon which Article 12 depends. There are no 
suggestions or indications in the regulation as to what is meant by “other appropriate 
measures.” It is possible, under the proposed amendment, that the effort reduction for a stock 
with very poor data is limited to -15%, while a stock with more information can end up with a -
25% effort reduction; this is counter-intuitive.   
Article 13: The formulation as it currently stands is difficult to implement because F is difficult 
to measure. The EWG proposes a method based on catch that could be used instead of the F 
based approach to demonstrate conformity with the regulation. 
Article 14: The implementation of the new Article 14.6 is problematic. A reallocation of quota 
is difficult in member states where the TAC is limited by relative stability / MS fixed internal 
allocation. The current draft could be interpreted in a way that quota could be reallocated 
towards fisheries with high cod bycatches. Fisheries that currently avoid bycatch of cod would 
need to give quota to fisheries with high bycatches. 
 
2 CONCLUSIONS OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP 
 
The following were identified in the compliance and industry response to approaches to 
management  
The option selected as the most favourable for enforcement (catch quotas) is the one least 
favoured by the fishermen responding to the questionnaire.  This difference can be partially 
explained through the choice of survey instrument.  An on-line questionnaire is not the most 
appropriate approach to gathering feedback on complex management options, as it is difficult 
to explain the operation of the management option, and not possible to know if the respondent 
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has completely understood all the details.  The evidence from the survey suggests that 
respondents were most concerned about the suggested limit on fishing once one quota had 
been exhausted. Fishers appear to prefer the current system with landings restrictions but 
scientists advise that this will not limit fishing mortality. The results do suggest general 
support for CCTV and fully documented fisheries.   
Inevitably, there are varying and divergent views on appropriate and desired management 
options given the variety of stakeholders and subgroups existing within the fisheries (e.g., 
varying fleets within and across MS, enforcers, managers, scientists). The two studies of the 
enforcement implications and fleet views of management options highlight these divergent 
views clearly.  Though the research behind each was preliminary and of a pilot-project 
standard, the results were indicative of the reality of divergent views held on potential 
management options.   The views of both enforcement agencies and those operating fishing 
vessels must be taken into account when designing long-term management regimes.  Ideally, 
the control measures should be efficient and reliable as well as easily understood and 
supported by the fishing industry.  
 
The following issues were identified in the review of the proposed changes to the cod plan: 
Article 9:  
The EWG notes theneed for alternative advice if assessments are not available; methods for 
Kattegat cod and Irish Sea cod are provided. 
Article 11: 
EWG supports the use of derogations for fisheries that do not catch significant proportions of 
cod and supports the removal of derogations that exist only when they occur because of cod 
depletion. 
EWG supports the recommendation to approve exemptions only for fishing activity outside 
the distribution area of cod and/or fishing with gear that minimizes cod catches. 
EWG considers that using the percentage of cod in the total catch as an exemption criterionis 
flawed, because even when percentages of cod in the catch are low, these catches can still 
contribute significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when cod 
abundance is low. EWG provides a list of options with pros and cons (Table 6.2). 
EWG notes the amendment does not include any requirement for monitoring whether the 
catches in the exempted areas, and by the exempted gear, remain low. STECF recommends 
that a requirement for periodical monitoring be added such that it can be verified whether the 
levels of cod catches of exempted vessels still conform to the criteria for entering the 
exemption.  
EWG notes that the enforcement and implementation of the proposed Article 11a1(a) could be 
problematic due to position reporting requirements and considers that: Exempted vessels 
could be required to report exact position, depth, and duration of each haul in logbooks, VMS 
transmissions should be increased to every 30 minutes. To provide verification MS should 
submit raw data on logbook, depth, and VMS from the entire fishing trip.  
Article 12:  
The EWG found the proposed amendments are unclear and difficult to follow. It is not clear 
what differentiates Articles 9.1 and 9.2, upon which Article 12 depends. How “insufficient” 
does information need to be to cause the process to move through Article 9.1 onto Article 9.2?  
There was a suggestion that a lack of scientific advice would cause this, but then Article 9.2b 
refers back to scientific advice so that cannot be a necessary and sufficient condition. There 
are no suggestions or indications in the regulation at to what is meant by “other appropriate 
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measures.” It is possible, under the proposed amendment, that the effort reduction for a stock 
with very poor data is limited to -15%, while a stock with more information can end up with a 
-25% effort reduction.  This seems counter-intuitive as normal practice would be to be more 
precautionary as the information base deteriorates. 
 
Article 13: 
STECF has repeatedly underlined the difficulty for stakeholders to evaluate the compliance to 
Article 13 requirements: cod avoidance measures must be demonstrated to yield at least as 
much reduction in Fishing mortality than otherwise would result from effort reduction. This 
formulation raises a number of issues, and in particular that 1) fishing mortality estimate is 
linked to the dynamics of the entire fishery, and therefore it is very difficult to monitor the 
beneficial effects of actions taken by only a subset of the fleet, 2) fishing mortality can only 
be monitored indirectly and ex-post through the use of an assessment model, and therefore the 
estimates are only available the year after the actions have taken place (if an assessment can 
be done at all) and 3) fishing mortality is a fairly abstract concept that the industry cannot 
monitor and manage directly, and which doesn’t have proportional relationship to catches. 
The EWG proposes a method based on catch that could be used, instead of the F based 
approach, to demonstrate conformity with the regulation. 
Article 14: 
The implementation of the new Article 14.6 is problematic. A reallocation of quota is difficult 
in member states where the TAC is limited by relative stability / MS fixed internal allocation. 
The current draft could be interpreted in a way that quota could be reallocated towards 
fisheries with high cod bycatches. Fisheries that currently avoid bycatch of cod would need to 
give quota to fisheries with high cod bycatches. This would create perverse incentives by 
rewarding those with higher discard rates.  
 
 
3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP 
 
There are no specific recommendations. 
 
 
4 INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In preparing for the development of multi-stock plans, the Commission is considering proposing 
possible improvements to the cod plan (Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008) with regards to the 
implementation problems identified by STECF (EWG 11-15 and PLEN 12-01).  STECF is 
therefore requested to advise on possible options for amending the cod plan built on the advice 
already provided in the spring plenary report. 
 
At the beginning of the meeting NS and NWW RACS were offered an opportunity to present 
position papers. These are attached to the report as Annex I and II respectively.  
 
The report below provides an introductory section on overall approaches to management 
measures based on work set up following the EWG 11-15 which reviewed the cod plans in 
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December 2011. Several sets of different general management approaches were selected and 
both industry and compliance experts were asked to contribute to an understanding of their 
effectiveness. Section 5 below presents results so far from these investigations. This is not 
intended as a direct comment on the proposed amendments for the cod plan but rather to inform 
the debate on the overall approach to achieving  catch management, with particular relevance to 
cod caught in mixed fisheries. 
 
Section 6 addresses the specific amendments to the Council Regulation 1342/2008 provided 
below in Section 4.3. In addition to specific comments to the regulation, the EWG provides 
information to help with the provision of management advice for cod stocks without assessments 
(Section 6.1) and calculation methods based on catch for situations where effort buy-back 
requires a comparison with the reduction in F (Section 6.4) 
4.2 Terms of Reference for EWG-12-07 
 
Review the draft Commission proposal as regards amendments for Article 9, 11 and 13 of the 
cod plan (see section 4.3) and the alternative option provided by Member States.  
 
Suggest alternative proposals, or ways in which the proposals could be improved or simplified 
as appropriate 
 
Discuss the pro and cons for each option proposed compared to existing fishing effort 
management methods 
4.3 Proposed amendments to cod plan received from the Commission for the EWG meeting 
‘Article 9 
Special procedure for setting TACs 
1. Where there is insufficient information to set the TACs in accordance with Article 7 or Article 
8, a TAC shall be adopted at the catch level corresponding to the level indicated by scientific 
advice,provided this is no more than 20 % greater than, or 25 % less than, the TAC in the 
previous year. 
2. Where there is insufficient information to set the TACs in accordance with Articles 7, 8 or 
9(1), a TAC shall be adopted at the catch level corresponding to: 
(a) a 25 % reduction compared to the TAC in the previous year, 
or, if the scientific advice so recommends, 
(b) up to a 25 % reduction compared to the TAC in the previous year together with other 
appropriate measures. 
3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, where there is insufficient information to set 
the TAC in the North Sea, the Skagerrak and the eastern Chanel in accordance with Article the 
appropriate level of TAC will be fixed following consultations with Norway.’ 
(1) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 are deleted 
(2) The following Article 11a is inserted: 
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‘Article 11a 
Derogation from the application of the fishing-effort regime 
1. Fishing effort used by a vessel during a trip shall not be counted against the maximum 
allowable fishing effort for the effort group concerned provided that: 
(a) the entire fishing activity of that trip by the vessel concerned is deployed only within an 
area outside cod-distribution areas as listed in accordance with paragraph 2 and/or 
at a depth greater than 300 m; 
or 
(b) the fishing vessel has only one regulated gear on board, the technical attributes of which 
result in cod catches of less than 1.5 % of the total catches measured by weight and 
listed in accordance with paragraph 2. 
2. Acting on a Commission proposal, on the information provided by Member States in line with 
the obligation set out in paragraph 3, and in accordance with scientific advice, the 
Council shall establish a list of areas and gears as referred to in paragraph 1 (a)(b). The 
areas and gears listed shall be exempt from applying the effort regime. 
3. Member States shall provide the appropriate data and information to allow the Commission to 
assess whether an area or a gear shall be on the list of the areas and gears to which 
fishing-effort limitations would not apply. 
4. If the fishing effort associated with the fishing activity provided for in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b) 
contributed to establishment of the baseline effort established in accordance with 
Article 12(2)(a), then the amount of effort associated with that activity shall be deducted 
from the baseline of the effort group concerned. 
5. Requests for exemption from the fishing-effort regime entailing adjustment of the baseline 
effort established in accordance with Article 12(2)(a) shall be submitted by Member 
States to the Commission within one year of the entry into force of this Regulation. 
Beyond that date, the Member States shall not be entitled to exclude any fishing activity 
that might comply with the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b). 
6. If the fishing effort associated with the fishing activity provided for in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b) 
has not contributed to establishment of the baseline effort, then the maximum allowable 
fishing effort of the effort group concerned remains unchanged. 
7. Detailed rules concerning the format and procedure for the transmission to the Commission of 
the information referred to in paragraphs 3, and 5 may be adopted by the Commission 
by way of implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
32.’ 
 
(3) Article 12 is amended as follows: 
(a) Paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 
‘4. For aggregated effort groups where the percentage cumulative catch calculated according to 
paragraph 3(b) is equal to or exceeds 20 %, annual adjustments shall apply to the effort groups 
concerned. The maximum allowable fishing effort of the groups concerned shall be calculated as 
follows: 
(a) where Articles 7 or 8 applies, by applying to the baseline the same percentage 
adjustment as that set out in those Articles for fishing mortality; 
(b) where Article 9(1) applies, by applying the same percentage adjustment in fishing effort 
as the adjustment of the TAC compared with the previous year; 
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(c) where Article 9(2)(a) applies, by applying a 15 % reduction compared to the maximum 
allowable fishing-effort allocation for the effort groups concerned in the previous 
year 
or if the scientific advice so recommends 
(d) where Article 9(2) applies, by applying up to a 15 % reduction compared to the 
maximum allowable fishing-effort allocation for the effort groups concerned in the 
previous year, together with other appropriate measures. 
(4) Paragraph (2)(b) of Article 13 is replaced by the following: 
‘(b) that can demonstrate to the Member State whose flag it is flying that its fishing 
activity results in a catch composition, including discards, of less than 5 % cod over the 
management period.’ 
(5) In Article 14 the following paragraphs 6 and 7 are added: 
‘6. Where the scientific data indicate that more than [10 %] of the total cod catches for a 
particular effort group are attributed to discards, or where the quota allocation does not 
correspond to the expected catches and would likely result in cod discards, the Member State 
concerned shall take immediate measures to minimise cod discards. 
7. Member States shall establish and include in their national control action programmes, as 
prescribed in Article 46 of Regulation 1224/2009, systems to ensure compliance with the 
conditions referred to in Articles 11a, 11b and 13. Member States shall assign a‘very high risk’ 
level to those vessels in their risk-based management as described in Article 5(3) of Regulation 
1224/2209.’ 
 
5 MANAGEMENT OPTIONS FOR THE NS – FISHERMEN AND THE EFFECT ON 
ENFORCEMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Kattegat, North Sea, Irish Sea and West of 
Scotland carried out by STECF in July 2011 indicated that landings quotas and effort were 
unlikely to deliver the objectives of the plans over the next few years. A number of issues were 
identified, in particular that landings quotas were unable to constrain catches of cod in these 
areas and that overall effort restrictions were having impacts well beyond the cod fisheries 
without yet delivering reductions in cod mortality.  
The STECF group that scoped options for the European Commission for the future (STECF 
EWG 12-15) has defined a range of management options for future plans. These were explored 
through an online questionnaire to fishermen and analysed from an enforcement perspective.  
Long term management plans require cost-effective and stable control measures that will 
deliver overall aims, but also provide some scope for flexibility if conditions require 
modifications to targets or objectives.  It is important therefore to consider the implications of 
control measures from the perspective of those enforcing the rules (the member state 
enforcement bodies) as well as from the perspective of those whose actions are being controlled 
(the owners/operators of fishing vessels).  This section tries to do that by exploring some of the 
cod management proposals from the perspective of enforcement through an evaluation of 
different control measures, and through asking a small sample of active fishers for their views 
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on how a small range of alternative management options might impact on their fishing 
activities and their businesses.   
In all cases the management options explored should be implemented on the national, regional 
or EU level. 
5.2 Management measures suggested by the STECF 
 
The candidate management measures suggested by the STECF for the NS included the 
following: 
 
The current plan: Continued use of the basis of the current plan (landings TACs, effort control 
with derogations) but with simplified and more consistent derogations for fleets reducing cod 
catch. 
 
Mixed fishery landings quotas: Mixed fishery landings quotas matched across species. 
 
Mixed fishery catch quotas: Mixed fishery catch quotas matched across species with in year 
increases if catches of cod kept below limits. 
 
Individual vessel/business catch quotas: A system of individual vessel/business catch quotas set 
at single species level but tie up once any quota is exhausted.   
 
Real time effort incentives: Effort based real time incentives (RTI) based on spatial effort 
allocations where effort is expended at higher tariffs for more critical areas. 
 
All management measures apart from the current plan involve: 
• Setting of mixed-fishery TACs for fisheries at the European level – agreed by 
Member States. These would be TACs for individual stocks which are set in a way 
that accounts for the fact that the different stocks are caught together in mixed-
fisheries. 
• Operation/implementation for landings or catches at or below the target at 
Regional/MS level. 
• Where catches are to be controlled, fishermen must agree that it is their responsibility 
to show that they are catching under the limits. 
• As a general principle non-compliance must carry sufficiently appropriate penalties.  
• This may involve specific contracts between licensees and MS authorities 
• Minor over-catch that is declared should be dealt with by banking and borrowing (i.e.  
max 10 %) for vessels between years at MS level, and not considered an offence. 
This also requires that borrowing/banking is permitted between the MS and the EU.  
• Non-compliance that does not result in excess/inappropriate catch could be dealt with 
initially by low penalties, which would be raised for repeated offences. 
• Non-compliance which results in significant false/under declaration of catch by 
should have penalties set taking the probability of detection into consideration as well 
as the potential financial gain detected, including removal of future fishing 
opportunities.  
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• Excessive penalties would be unfair and unreasonable but failure to have sufficiently 
stringent penalties will incentivize non-compliance.  
5.3 Management measures effect on enforcement and compliance 
 
Each of the five management options was broken down into management components which 
were then evaluated from an enforcement perspective using the following criteria:  
• Controllability - is the management measure possible to control? 
• Enforcement tools – how will the management measure be controlled in practice?  
• Cost-effectiveness - Is the control measure cost effective?  
• Compliance - What are the requirements for compliance?  
• Infringements - What are the types of infringements that can occur in relation to the 
management measure?  
• Obstacles - Are there any obstacles for the fisherman to comply with the management 
measure? 
• Incentives - Can incentives for compliance be created?  
Annex III contains a more detailed analysis from which the following results are drawn  
5.4 Results of the enforcement analysis 
 
Following the evaluation it was apparent that the individual vessel/business catch quotas 
management option, with some additions, is the preferred option from an enforcement 
perspective. In summary the management option includes:  
 
1. Catch quota management (CQM) and fully documented fisheries (FDF) 
2. Individual vessel/business catch quotas 
3. Seasonal and area measures 
 
5.5 Catch Quota Management (CQM) and fully documented fisheries (FDF) 
The enforcement problem consists of ensuring that the fishers fully document the extraction 
from the resource, i.e. that all catches are being fully reported in the logbook as either landings 
or discards (FDF). The cost and efficiency of the enforcement tools used to enforce the catch 
quota management system will vary depending on whether or not discarding is regulated.  
The diagram below illustrates that CQM and FDF can be regulated in combination with a full 
discard ban, a partial discard ban with exempted species, and without a discard ban but where 
catches and discards are reported in the logbook. All options are difficult to enforce but a full 
discard ban is clearly superior to the other alternatives. In addition to achieving the greatest 
confidence in catch levels it is also the least difficult as well as the most cost-effective option to 
enforce.  
Controlling a CQM/FDF system in combination with any of the options for regulating discarding 
practices requires monitoring of the fishing activity at sea where the discarding takes place. 
There are four enforcement tools that allow for that; on board observers, patrol vessels, aircraft 
and CCTV-systems (sensors, GPS, cameras). Other enforcement tools such as landings and 
administrative controls can be used to identify irregularities in the length and catch composition 
that indicate discarding has taken place.  
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CCTV-systems can provide coverage of the all fishing activities for a fraction of the cost of other 
enforcement tools at sea. For this reason it is a superior tool from an enforcement perspective 
whilst also providing highly useful information on the fishing activity through electronic sensor 
and GPS4 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verification 
needed 
That no catch is  
discarded. 
 
That no catch of included 
species is discarded (possibly  
by species and quantity). 
 
Quantity and species discarded  
of exempted species. 
Quantity and species  
discarded. 
Reporting  Logbook = catch  
Landings declaration = 
catch  
Logbook = catch + discards 
Landings declaration =  
catch – allowed discards 
Logbook = catch + discards 
Landings declaration =  
catch - discards 
 
Infringement Discard ban  Discard ban and misreporting Misreporting  
Confidence in  
catch levels (1 highest) 
1 2* 3 
Cost (1 highest)  3 2* 1 
Catch quotas 
No discard ban  Discard ban with exempted species 
Full discard ban 
E
f
t
FDF 
 
* If exempted species are only present in some fisheries and/or are very different in size etc. from other catch, 
controllability can be improved.  
                                                 
44 can provide geographical position every 10 seconds  
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Individual vessel/business catch quotas  
The enforcement problem consists of ensuring that the catch is reported accurately and counted 
in the quotas. By introducing a FDF-system that is primarily controlled by a CCTV-system in 
combination with other enforcement tools such as landings control, this can be achieved. 
From an enforcement perspective individual quotas are preferred over collective quotas since it 
allows the fishermen to fully bear the benefits of complying with the rules as well as directly 
bearing the cost of any illegal activity.  The initial allocation of quotas is an important key to 
achieve compliance. In fisheries with a large overcapacity the initial allocation is difficult. 
Furthermore, the allocation of choke species in fisheries where the national quota of the species 
is very small, due to the relative stability, is difficult. 
Gear, area and time measures  
To limit discarding the technical measures in place have to support and allow for a selective 
fishery. In the North Sea these measures have the benefit of already being in place, i.e. systems 
have been put in place and the industry and authorities have adapted to the change.  
Controls on area and time measures (e.g. seasonal and/or areas closures) are to a large extent 
carried out at sea using patrol vessels and aircraft. Other tools used are VMS systems to track 
where the fishing activity takes place. 
Time or area closures, without exception, are preferred to technical regulations since it makes 
control at sea easier and more cost-effective. In general limiting regulations such as ‘one net’ 
rules and fishing in specific limited areas per trip ease the control burden.  
 
Concluding remarks on enforcement  
From an enforcement perspective a slightly modified version of the individual vessel/business 
option should be implemented for the NS. This management option is primarily a catch quota 
management (CQM) system in which the quotas are allocated to the individual fisherman or 
business.   The accuracy of the reported catch is ensured by CCTV systems within the 
framework of a fully documented fishery (FDF).   
In order for the management option to achieve its objectives it is important that the effect on 
compliance and enforcement of the entire system of management measures is considered.  From 
this perspective it is crucial that the control measures: 
 
• are harmonized over regions and MS as far as possible to avoid actual or perceived 
unfairness. 
• are kept to a minimum to avoid spreading limited control funds over a large number of  
measures.  
• ensure that the fishers receive the benefits of complying with the rules as well as bearing 
the costs of non-compliance.  
• carry appropriate penalties for non-compliance; failure to have sufficiently stringent 
penalties could incentivize non-compliance.  
• consider incentives for  fishers to comply with the rules. 
• are stable over time (as far as possible) to avoid confusion and mistakes.  
• are understood and accepted by the industry   
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• are applied in the most cost- efficient way using the appropriate tools and intensity to 
control each management option. 
5.6 Results of the survey of vessel owners/operators 
An on-line questionnaire was developed to explore views of vessel owners/operators to the 
different management options.  Only 19 useable responses were received.  Of these all 
respondents operate in the North Sea, 4 in the West of Scotland, 2 in Eastern Channel, and 4 in 
other areas.  A total of 12 respondents were targeting cod, and other key species include 
haddock, saithe, whiting, and monkfish.   
Each management approach was explained more fully in the questionnaire using a sketch of a 
fishing boat and short summaries highlighting key aspects of the proposed management regime.  
Each management approach was described using the bare minimum of information to get across 
the main aspects of the approach.  The same set of questions was asked about each management 
approach in turn to obtain respondent views on whether the approach would be more difficult, no 
different, or easier than the current situation for the following activities: 
 
• Managing my fishing effort 
• Controlling costs 
• Managing my cod quota 
• Managing my quota for other species  
• Reducing discards of cod 
• Reducing discards of other species 
• Using my knowledge and judgement about when and where to fish 
• Fish safely  
• Adapting my effort to the weather and other environmental conditions 
Respondents were also asked to indicate potential financial impacts (i.e. changes in annual 
income, profit, input costs (fuel, supplies, new gear, repairs), and number and type of crew 
employed), and provide an indication of how difficult they felt it would be to enforce the 
approach. 
The Individual vessel/business catch quota option was viewed as the least favourable approach.  
More than half of respondents indicated that under this option the following activities would be 
more difficult: 
• Managing my fishing effort 
• Managing my cod quota 
• Managing my quota for other species  
• Reducing discards of cod 
• Reducing discards of other species 
In addition more than half of all respondents indicated fishing safely and adapting to weather and 
conditions would be no different.  More than half of respondents indicated the approach would 
have a negative impact on annual income and profit. Five respondents indicated that managing 
effort, cod quota and cod discards would be easier, and four indicated a positive impact on 
annual income from fishing activities.  When asked for specific opinions on the approach the 
focus of respondents was on the impact of the quota issue on their activities.  Problems identified 
included:   
“I cannot take my entire quota” 
“Will not work because the small quota on whiting would stop you fishing within weeks” 
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“Unworkable – impossible to stop fishing when one species is caught” 
“Most would be forced to sell up or go bankrupt” 
“Cannot stop fishing when one species is caught” 
Respondents also indicated that the perceived abundance of cod caused problems in terms of 
meeting or exceeding their quotas: 
“It’s impossible to fish and avoid cod due to their abundance” 
“There has always been a dominant species, ‐ trying to regulate the fishery on one species will 
always result in abuse and discards of the dominant species” 
 
When respondents were asked about benefits of the approach they also focused on the quota 
issue: 
“Vessels with high quota will be able to fish as they should those that have no quota will have 
to stop fishing sooner” 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in long term will reduce leasing costs” 
The views provided by the respondents suggests that those who had adequate quota would be 
better off under this management approach, but those with low quota would suffer, because as 
soon as their quota for a species was used up they would have to tie up.  The nature of the on-
line questionnaire suggests that some of the respondents picked up on this particular aspect of 
the proposed approach and it strongly influenced their opinions. 
What is interesting from the responses received is the level of support for particular 
implementation techniques.  There appears to be general support for activities such as banking 
and borrowing from one year to the next, and for CCTV.  Examples of responses include: 
“CCTV is very good on reducing cod discards and making the skipper think where to fish and 
with what size” 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in the long term will reduce leasing costs. In favour 
of expanding CCTV to certain boats/species” 
“Banking and borrowing with a 15% limit would help” 
“Banking and borrowing is a good idea” 
In terms of ease of enforcement the majority of respondents felt that the current plan would be 
easiest to enforce, and the mixed fishery catch quota option the most difficult.  Respondents 
were equally divided over the ease with which the individual vessel/business catch quotas 
option and the real time incentives option could be implemented with half thinking they 
would be easier and half thinking they would be more difficult.   
5.7 Summary management options 
It is interesting to note that the options selected as the most favourable for enforcement is the 
one least favoured by the fishermen responding to the questionnaire.  This difference can be 
partially explained through the choice of survey instrument.  An on-line questionnaire is not 
the most appropriate approach to gathering feedback on complex management options, as it is 
difficult to explain the operation of the management option, and not possible to know if the 
respondent has completely understood all the details.  The evidence from the survey suggests 
that respondents were most concerned about the suggested limit on fishing once one quota 
had been exhausted.  This may have unduly influenced their opinions of the management 
option, although there are key socio-economic issues that need to be examined more closely, 
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relating to the impact of such a measure on vessel profitability, and on the amount of time it 
might be tied up at the quay.  The results do suggest general support for CCTV and fully 
documented fisheries.   
Inevitably, there are varying and divergent views on appropriate and desired management 
options given the variety of stakeholders and subgroups existing within the fisheries (e.g., 
varying fleets within and across MS, enforcers, managers, scientists). The two studies of the 
enforcement implications and fleet views of management options highlight these divergent 
views clearly.  Though the research behind each was preliminary and of a pilot-project 
standard, the results were indicative of the reality of divergent views held on potential 
management options.   Such varying views must be understood and taken into account when 
making decisions in order for the management options to be equitable and fair while also 
being the most appropriate for reaching stated management goals.  In short the views of both 
enforcement agencies and those operating fishing vessels must be taken into account when 
designing long-term management regimes.  Ideally, the control measures should be efficient 
and reliable as well as easily understood and supported by the fishing industry.  
 
6 COMMENTS ON AMENDMENTS TO COD PLANS 
The section below details comments, and in some cases additional information, intended to 
improve implementation and likely success of the cod plans. They are organised according to 
aspects that relate to each of Article 9,11-14 in turn.   
6.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 9 
Some amendments are proposed to the text and are linked directly with Article 12. As these 
aspects need to be considered in the context of Article 12,  the discussion of these changes is 
given in section 6.3 which deals with Article 12. 
Article 9 concerns the provision of catch/TAC advice in the absence of an assessment.  
Currently two of the cod stocks have assessments, (West of Scotland and North Sea) but two 
do not (Kattegat and Irish Sea). The following sections (6.1.1 and 6.1.2) are provided to 
illustrate two specific examples that could be used for Irish Sea cod and Kattegat cod 
respectively in the situation that assessments providing short term forecasts are not available. 
Currently, assessments are available for North Sea and West of Scotland cod stocks. The 
method described for the Kattegat cod is specific to that situation and may not be generally 
applicable, but the approach for Irish Sea cod is more generic and based on methods being 
developed by ICES.  
6.1.1 ADVICE FOR IRISH SEA COD IF ASSESSMENT AND SHORT TERM FORECAST ARE UNAVAILABLE. 
STECF draws the following information from the use of ICES WKLIFE/RGLIFE Guidelines 
in situations where stocks do not have assessments 
Of the three cod stocks: North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland, all now have accepted 
assessments, but catch forecasts are only provided for two (North Sea and West of Scotland). 
Catch forecasts are not provided for Irish Sea cod because of the high uncertainty associated 
with mortality values in recent years caused by unaccounted mortality.  
In circumstances where an assessment is no longer available to provide a forecast which could 
be used to follow the management plan, the ICES WKLIFE/RGLIFE Guidelines could be 
used as a basis for providing catch advice. These guidelines were developed in order to 
provide a basis for giving quantitative advice for as many data-limited stocks as possible, for 
which, until recently (2011), ICES had not provided catch advice. Of over 200 stock for 
which ICES provides advice, there have been around 122 that were considered data-limited 
because of a lack of catch forecast (e.g. the was no accepted analytical assessment). These 
guidelines have been formulated on the basis of outcomes from several workshops and 
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groups, such as WKFRAME-III, WKLIFE, RGLIFE and other groups within ICES (such as 
ADGDEEP). These guidelines remain a work-in-progress, with some recommended methods 
having been simulation-tested, others still requiring such testing, and some simply based on 
“common sense”. Expert groups within ICES have been encouraged to explore the most 
appropriate approaches, checking for consistency of application, and providing justification 
for decisions made. 
 
General principles associated with developing these guidelines have been that stocks are 
categorised according to available data and analyses, that categories reflect decreasing 
availability of data (e.g. fishing pressure and state of the stock estimates are less certain 
moving down the categories), and that increasing precaution is applied in increasingly 
uncertain situations (more precaution is applied down the categories). The categories are 
currently defined as follows: 
1. Data-rich stocks (quantitative assessments are available for forecasts) 
2. Qualitative assessments and forecasts (trends only) 
3. Survey only (stock abundance trends) 
4. Reliable catch data only (short time-series) 
5. Data-limited (landings data only) 
6. Minor bycatch or negligible landings  
Methods have been developed within each of these categories, according to the following schematic 
Figure 6./1: 
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Figure 6.1 General schematic for provision of advice for stocks with different levels of information 
Under this scheme, Irish Sea cod could not be classed as falling under Category 1 because of a 
lack of forecast under the ICES framework, but could fall under Category 2, which is given in 
more detail in the following schematic: 
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Figure 6.2 General schematic for provision of advice for stocks with Category 2 information:  
assessment indicative of trends 
There are three methods under Category 2, but because SSB levels for Irish Sea cod are so low 
(well below Blim), the appropriate method would be applying the precautionary approach, 
which requires a recovery plan and possibly zero catch. 
 
6.1.2 ADVICE FOR KATTEGAT COD IF ASSESSMENT AND SHORT TERM FORECAST ARE UNAVAILABLE. 
 
6.1.2.1 BACKGROUND FOR KATTEGAT COD ADVICE 
The very low cod TAC and even lower reported landings in the most recent years have given 
a very uncertain ICES stock assessment with respect to estimation of fishing mortality.  In 
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addition the trend of estimated F depends very much on the option for estimation on 
unallocated mortality (e.g. due to fishery or due to return migrations of North Sea cod which 
have entered the Kattegat as juveniles). Consequently, the ICES assessment cannot be used as 
a basis for evaluating the most recent F in relation to any F reference point given in the 
management plan. This section presents the results of an alternative approach to estimate 
fishing mortality and discusses the potential use of such information in the management of the 
Kattegat fisheries. In addition, likely scenarios for the management of Kattegat are discussed.  
Today, the main catches of cod in Kattegat are taken by the TR2 trawl segment. Several 
management measures have been applied to decrease F on Kattegat cod, and to maintain the 
present level of TR2 fishing effort for the economically important fisheries targeting 
Nephrops and sole. The most important measures include the introduction of closed areas (see 
Figure 6.3) and use of gears with lower retention of cod. 
 
Figure. 6.3 Bathymetry of Kattegat and Closed Areas: 
• The “black” seasonally closed area is closed during the period 1st January to 31th March, except for fishery with 
selective gears; The “black” area in the Northern Sound (”Kilen” or the Triangle) is closed 1st February to 
31th March, except for fishery with selective gears; 
•The “orange” partially closed area is closed for all fisheries in the period 1st January to31th March. Fisheries with 
selective gears are allowed 1st April to 31th December; 
• The “red” permanently closed area is closed for all fisheries, including recreational fisheries. 
 
The main gear used by the TR2 segmentof the Danish fishery before 2009was a trawl with 
90mm diamond mesh cod end . The use of a 120 mm square mesh panel became mandatory in 
February 2009. Since August 2011 trawls equipped with 180 mm square mesh or 270 mm 
diamond mesh SELTRA have been mandatory for Jan-Sep, while 120 mm square mesh panel 
is also allowed in the rest of the year to obtain a higher catch rate of sole. In addition a 
SELTRA 300 mm square mesh panel can be applied year round. This gear gives access to the 
closed areas when selective gears are required.    
The standard gear for the Swedish fisheries was a trawl with 90 mm diamond mesh cod-end. 
There has been a shift towards use of trawl with sorting grid in combination with a 70 mm 
square mesh cod-end, such that 59% of the TR2 effort in 2011 was applied with that gear. The 
sorting grid gives access to the closed areas when selective gears are required. 
6.1.2.2 ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN FISHING IMPACT 
The relative fishing impact (proxy for fishing mortality) has been quantified for the Danish 
and Swedish TR2 segments which are the most economically important fishery in Kattegat 
and the fishery with the largest cod catches. Fishing impact is calculated from the temporal 
and spatial distribution of the cod stock (estimated from survey observations) and the fishery 
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effort (estimated from VMS). It is assumed that fishing impact is proportional to the sum of 
the product of the local cod density, local fishing effort and the size selection of the applied 
gears. In other words, the method gives a prediction of the fishing impact on the cod stock, 
given that we know the distribution of the cod, the distribution of the fishery and the gear 
applied. 
6.1.2.3 RESULTS FOR FISHING IMPACT 
The fishing impact on cod in 2011 was estimated by effort model to be reduced to 41%, 35% 
and 31% of the level in 2008 (i.e. before the area closures were implemented), for age 1, age 2 
and age 3 plus, respectively (see table below). 
Year  Age 1   Age 2  Age 3+ 
2008  100%  100%  100% 
2009  69%  54%  47% 
2010  59%  47%  44% 
2011  41%  35%  31% 
The reduction in fishing impact was highest in the first year of the area closures, followed by 
modest (absolute) further reductions in succeeding years.  
Sensitivity analyses show that the assumed size selection of cod by the different gears has a 
direct effect on the absolute modelled fishing impact. However, the modelled change in 
fishing impact between years seems rather robust to the choice of size selection parameters as 
long as the values used are reasonable well estimated.  
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Figure. 6.4 Harvest rate, i.e. catch (landings plus discards) divided by the SSB (upper panel); and fishing 
mortality by age (lower panel) from the assessment run including discard data, and no estimation of unallocated 
mortality. (from ICES 2012). 
F estimates from the ICES assessments (Fig 6.4) have a similar reduction for age 3 and older 
cod as modelled by the fishing impact analysis. The available discard data indicate a stable 
high fishing mortality on cod age-groups 1-2 in 2008-2011 when used in the assessment. This 
is in contrast to the reduction as modelled by the fishing impact analysis.  The assessment F 
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values are however, from an assessment without estimation of unallocated mortality (e.g. 
return migrations of North Sea cod which have entered the Kattegat as juveniles) which will 
have a pronounced effect on age 2 where around 50% are assumed sexually mature and the 
North Sea recruits are expected to migrate back to the North Sea. In addition the absolute 
level of discard mortality depends very much on the natural mortality applied (0.20) of 
juveniles. A higher natural mortality (e.g. around 1.0 for age 1 and around 0.7 for age 2 as 
used in the North Sea cod assessment) will decrease the estimate of discard mortality 
considerably.      
The harvest rate estimates by ICES show a rather stable rate since 2008 and do not confirm 
the results from the fishing impact analysis. Harvest rates have been calculated as the sum of 
catch of both juveniles and adults over the biomass of adults (SSB). Harvest rate showing the 
sum of catch weight of adults (weight at age times proportion mature at age) divided by the 
SSB (Figure6.4 Upper panel) show the same trend as the ICES version.   
 
6.1.2.4 FISHING IMPACT AND THE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The present cod management plan includes a target F3-5 at 0.4 for Kattegat cod.  Fishing impact 
on age 3 plus (equivalent to ages 3-5) in 2011 is modelled to be 31% of the value in 2008. 
Therefore, the absolute F3-5modelled by this method is at present below target F at 0.40 (for 
SSB >Bpa), given a (high) F of around one in 2008 (F3-5or more correctly, Z-0.2, is estimated 
within the range 1.11 and 0.45 by the two ICES assessments (ICES 2012)) . However, SSB is 
low and most likely below Blim. In such cases the management plan dictates that F shall be 
reduced by 25% per year (equivalent to 0.75^3=42% of the F level remaining after a period of 
3 years), which is a smaller reduction than the modelled realized reduction in fishing impact. 
These calculations indicate that the aim of the management plan to reduce F3-5 has worked, but 
the objective to rebuild SSB to above Bpa has clearly not been reached, even though an 
increase in SSB has been detected from this analysis and the ICES stock assessment 
(Figure6.5).  
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Figure 6.5. Spawning stock biomass of cod in the Kattegat estimated in ICES assessment: i) excluding discards 
and estimating total removals within the model (black line) and ii) including the discards (red line). Shaded area 
and dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the two runs, respectively (ICES 2012).  
6.1.2.5 FISHERIES IMPACT AND OTHER ANALYSIS USED TO AS SUPPLEMENT TO THE ICES ASSESSMENT. 
The two ICES assessments provide very different F values, but the SSB estimates in these 
assessments seem less sensitive to the assumption of unallocated mortality. This does not mean 
that the result is unbiased, but ICES accepts the SSB results as basis for the advice. The fishing 
impact analysis does not make use of landings and discards and is not sensitive to “unallocated 
mortality” as long as the return migration is fairly stable and does not lead to substantial 
changes in the cod distribution. One approach could therefore be to use the biomass estimate 
from the ICES assessment and the modelled fishing impact as proxy for fishing mortality.      
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There is presently no Fmsy defined for Kattegat cod. For the North Sea cod Fmsy is presently 
set at Fmax which is within the range of fishing mortalities consistent with FMSY (0.16–0.42) 
(ICES 2012). With an Fmsy for Kattegat cod in the high end of the range specified for North 
Sea cod, the estimate of F for 2011 is below Fmsy. 
The harvest rate plots (Fig 6.4 and 6.5) show both a substantial decline in harvest rate down to 
a value of around 0.4 in 2011. There is a large uncertainty around the estimate of discard for the 
individual years, but given a good observer coverage or FDF the harvest rate method will give 
a robust estimate of harvest rate, which can be seen as a proxy for fishing mortality. This 
information could be used for management in cases where a full assessment is not available 
(Article 9b).    
6.1.2.6 SCENARIOS FOR APPLICATION OF THE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR KATTEGAT COD 
With the present situation, where no analytical assessment for use in management is available, 
but SSB is likely below Blim, Article 9a (Procedure for setting TACs in poor data conditions) 
is applied which results in a TAC reduction at 25%. With a TAC at 133 t in 2012, the absolute 
reduction in potential landings is minimal. However, Article 12, 4(b) dictates the same 
percentage adjustment in fishing effort as the reduction of the TAC, equivalent to 25%. With 
the presently low SSB (Fig 6.6) of less than 2kt it will take several years to rebuild to Blim (6.4 
kt) and even longer to rebuild to Bpa (10.5 t). As long as SSB is below Blim application of 
Article 9a (“where STECF advises that the catches of cod should be reduced to the lowest 
possible level”) will require a 25% reduction of both TAC and effort each year. For higher 
SSB, the default annual reduction in TAC and effort is 15% (Article 9b) but the regulation is 
open for other options. 
A range of management measures to reduce cod catch has been applied for Kattegat and the 
results from the analysis of fishing impact show a substantial reduction in fishing mortality 
within 4 years. It is not known if the reduction in F is sufficient to bring SSB back to the 
preferred level, but it will take several years for the cod stock to recover to above Bpa even 
with no fishery. In the meanwhile application of the management plan will have reduced 
allowed effort to a very low level and in practice closed the fisheries for demersal fish and 
Nephrops in Kattegat. This may not have been the intention of the MP. A less drastic effort 
reduction may be appropriate for cases like the Kattegat cod once all fleets can be shown to be 
operating correctly within derogations such as those under Article 11 and 13. 
Given an analytical assessment for Kattegat cod, a 25% reduction in F is required for SSB 
below Blim (Article 7). The same percentage adjustment as used for F must be applied for 
effort. This means that the effort reduction is the same as when Article 9 is applied, such that 
effort will become close to zero before SSB eventually reaches Blim. 
If SSB increases rapidly in the future to between Blim and Bpaor for SSB above Bpa an F 
reduction of 15% and 10% respectively must be applied, but F cannot be smaller than 0.4.  The 
same percentage adjustment as used for F (after adjustment to 0.4) must be applied for effort. 
For the Kattegat case this will stop the effort reduction and lead to a TAC increase of up to 
20%. With a TAC in 2012 at 131 t and potential further 25% reductions in the coming years, a 
20 % increase in TAC will just give an insignificant increase in absolute terms. Such low TAC 
would lead to a substantial discard in the demersal fishery. However, this problem is 
conditional on relatively good recovery of the stock. 
In case of several years with 25% effort reduction, the Nephrops fishery may continue if trawls 
with sorting grid are applied, given an Article 11 exemption for effort reduction. This will 
exclude catches of cod larger than 40 cm, but result in a significantly higher catches of juvenile 
cod compared with the catches from the presently used SELTRA trawls. The use of sorting grid 
will lead to a substantial loss of landings of fish species like sole and plaice and might decrease 
catches of Nephrops as well. 
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6.1.2.7 SUMMARY OF KATTEGAT COD ADVICE WITHOUT AN ASSESSMENT 
 
• The ICES stock assessment is too uncertain with respect to estimation of fishing mortality to be 
applied for evaluating the most recent F in relation to any F reference point given in the 
management plan.  
• This uncertainty about F is mainly due to a high factor estimated for “unallocated mortality”. 
The assessment model scales landings to give the best fit to survey cpue. However “unallocated 
mortality” seems more to be due to return migrations of North Sea cod which have entered the 
Kattegat as juveniles. This raises the question about the validity of both the assessment and 
stock identity of the “Kattegat cod”.     
• Denmark and Sweden have established closed areas in 2009 and their fisheries have changed to 
more selective gears to decrease fishing mortality of cod. 
• A spatial analysis, independent of catches and “unallocated mortality”, shows that the fishing 
impact (a proxy for Fishing mortality) on cod age 3+ in 2011 is 31% of the value in 2008. This 
reduction is due to the closed areas, use of more selective gears and a general effort reduction. 
• By combining the change in fishing effort from the fishing impact analysis with the change in F 
estimated by the ICES assessment, F3-5in 2011 is estimated to be lower than the target F (0.4) 
and a likely proxy for Fmsy. 
• Estimates of harvest rate provide a robust estimate of the trend and absolute level of fishing 
mortality. Analysis shows a substantial decline in harvest rate since 2000 down to a value of 
around 0.4 in 2011. Information on trend and absolute value of harvest rate and fishing impact 
should be used as F proxies for management in cases where a full assessment is not available 
(Article 9b). 
• Even though SSB for 2012 is estimated considerably higher compared to 2009 (45% to 112% 
increase depending on the ICES assessment used), SSB in 2012 is still estimated to be below 
2kt.  
• The management plan will result in a 25% reduction in effort by year with application of both 
Article 7 (assessment is available) or Article 9 (no assessment is available), as SSB is far below 
Blim (6.4 kt). 
• The management plan will lead to a 25 % effort reduction per year for several years. as 
recovery to above Blim needs a 3-fold increase in SSB. This will reduce effort to close to zero. 
• The management plan has no lower limit for target F or effort. For the Kattegat cod this will 
likely lead to a substantial effort reduction and in practice close all fisheries for demersal fish, 
before the cod stock is recovered. This is due to the time lag between the introduction of 
substantial measures to decrease F and the rebuilding of the stock.  
• With SSB above Blim, Article 7 will probably not lead to further effort reduction. Article 9 
operates with a default 15% effort reduction for such situations but no further effort reduction 
could also be an option. Good quality information on F proxies and SSB is available to 
substantiate advice from STECF on management in cases where Article 9 b is applicable.   
• TAC in 2012 is at 133 t. Further reduction in TAC has practically no direct economic 
implications for the fishery. 
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6.2 PROPOSED CHANGES TO ARTICLE 11 
Table 6.1presents the text of the current Article 11, the problems identified by the joint 
STECF-ICES evaluation of the cod plan, and the proposed amendments by the Commission. 
The first problem that the evaluation had identified is that one of the three possible causal 
mechanisms that would lead to low cod catches may be the depleted status of the stock 
(depletion decoupling) and that in such a case approving exemption would have undesirable 
effects. The evaluation recommended that exemptions should only be approved when the 
fishing activity is deployed outside the distribution area of cod (spatial decoupling), or if 
deployed within the cod distribution area, when the used fishing gear is designed and 
confirmed to minimize cod catches (technical decoupling). The proposed amendment 
accounts for this, by removing the possibility to gain exemption based on low catches based 
on depletion; the proposed amendment follows the STECF recommendation to approve 
exemptions only for fishing activity outside the distribution area of cod and/or fishing with 
gear that minimizes cod catches. 
The second problem identified by the evaluation is the industry's perceptions regarding 
Article 11. The industry found the process to gain exemption difficult and lengthy. Moreover, 
they found that there was a lack of transparency over the data to be collected and over the 
criteria to deliver the exemption (specifically, they experienced the criteria as changing over 
time and between MS requests). In general the proposed amendment seems to alleviate this 
problem because the MSs no longer have to apply for exemption for individual groups of 
vessel; instead the exemption would automatically be granted to vessels when the fishing 
activity is deployed in an approved area and/or with an approved gear. Observers from the 
stakeholder organization confirmed that this may be an improvement but warned that issues of 
defining the gears and areas may come up when trying to implement the amended regulation.  
 
 Table 6.1 Current Article 11 clauses, problems identified by STECF and proposed changes to the Article,  
Current Article 11 Problems identified by STECF-ICES evaluation 
2011 
Proposed amendments by Commission 
1. The TACs set out in Articles 7, 8 and 
9 shall be complemented by a fishing 
effort regime whereby fishing 
opportunities in terms of fishing effort 
are allocated to Member States on an 
annual basis. 
 Remains in place 
The Council may, acting on a 
Commission proposal and on the basis of 
the information provided by Member 
States and the advice of STECF referred 
to in paragraph 3, exclude certain groups 
of vessels from the application of the 
effort regime 
provided that: 
(a) appropriate data on cod catches and 
discards are available to allow STECF to 
assess the percentage of cod catches 
made by each group of vessels 
concerned; 
(b) the percentage of cod catches as 
assessed by STECF does not exceed 1,5 
% of the total catches for each group of 
vessels concerned; and 
(c) the inclusion of these groups of 
vessels in the effort regime would 
constitute an administrative burden 
disproportionate to their overall impact 
on cod stocks. If STECF is not in 
position to assess that these conditions 
remain fulfilled, the Council shall 
include each group of vessels concerned 
Exemptions through Article 11 require low 
cod catches. These exemptions should only be 
approved when the fishing activity is 
deployed outside the distribution area of cod, 
or if deployed within the cod distribution 
area, when the used fishing gear is designed 
and confirmed to minimize cod catches. 
 
Basing monitoring on percentage of cod in the 
total catch (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) is 
flawed, because even when percentages of cod 
in the catch are low, these catches can still 
contribute significantly to overall cod mortality 
if overall catch or effort is high or when 
abundance is low. Cod by-catch ceilings 
expressed as percentages of total catch also have 
a perverse incentive to maintain or increase 
catches of other species. STECF identified 
bycatch ceilings as a flaw in the design of the 
plan. A system based on proportion of total 
expected cod outtake from the whole fishery 
would be more appropriate, and likely no more 
difficult to monitor. 
Deleted 
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in the effort regime. 
3. Member States shall provide annually 
appropriate information to the 
Commission and STECF to establish that 
the above conditions are and remain 
fulfilled in accordance with detailed rules 
to be adopted by the Commission. 
 Deleted 
 Basing monitoring on percentage of cod in the 
total catch (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) is 
flawed, because even when percentages of cod 
in the catch are low, these catches can still 
contribute significantly to overall cod mortality 
if overall catch or effort is high or when 
abundance is low. Cod by-catch ceilings 
expressed as percentages of total catch also have 
a perverse incentive to maintain or increase 
catches of other species. STECF identified 
bycatch ceilings as a flaw in the design of the 
plan. A system based on proportion of total 
expected cod outtake from the whole fishery 
would be more appropriate, and likely no more 
difficult to monitor. 
 
The industry perception of article 11 is that it is 
difficult to gain exemption and that it has 
proved impossible to gain exemption for fleets 
that catch few cod because of problems of 
providing sufficient data (see NSRAC 
submission Annex 2). It is noted in the 
submission by the NWWRAC (Annex 3) that 
there is lack of transparency over the criteria to 
deliver the exemption and over the data to be 
collected. Secondly, the NWWRAC paper notes 
that where vessels have been shown not to catch 
cod, then the exemption should be provided 
within a shorter time frame. 
8. Fishing  effort  used  by  a  vessel  during  a  trip  shall  not  be 
counted  against  the maximum  allowable  fishing  effort  for 
the effort group concerned provided that: 
(a) the  entire  fishing  activity  of  that  trip  by  the  vessel 
concerned is deployed only within an area outside cod‐
distribution  areas  as  listed  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 2 and/or at a depth greater than 300 m; 
or 
(b) the  fishing  vessel  has  only  one  regulated  gear  on 
board,  the  technical attributes of which  result  in  cod 
catches  of  less  than  1.5 %  of  the  total  catches 
measured  by  weight  and  listed  in  accordance  with 
paragraph 2. 
9. Acting  on  a  Commission  proposal,  on  the  information 
provided by Member States  in  line with  the obligation set 
out in paragraph 3, and in accordance with scientific advice, 
the  Council  shall  establish  a  list  of  areas  and  gears  as 
referred to in paragraph 1 (a)(b). The areas and gears listed 
shall be exempt from applying the effort regime. 
10. Member  States  shall  provide  the  appropriate  data  and 
information to allow the Commission to assess whether an 
area or a gear shall be on the list of the areas and gears to 
which fishing‐effort limitations would not apply. 
11. If  the  fishing  effort  associated  with  the  fishing  activity 
provided  for  in  paragraphs  1(a)  or  1(b)  contributed  to 
establishment  of  the  baseline  effort  established  in 
accordance with Article 12(2)(a), then the amount of effort 
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associated  with  that  activity  shall  be  deducted  from  the 
baseline of the effort group concerned. 
12. Requests  for  exemption  from  the  fishing‐effort  regime 
entailing  adjustment  of  the  baseline  effort  established  in 
accordance  with  Article  12(2)(a)  shall  be  submitted  by 
Member States  to  the Commission within one year of  the 
entry  into  force of  this Regulation. Beyond  that date,  the 
Member States shall not be entitled to exclude any fishing 
activity that might comply with the conditions referred to in 
paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b). 
13. If  the  fishing  effort  associated  with  the  fishing  activity 
provided for in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b) has not contributed 
to establishment of the baseline effort, then the maximum 
allowable  fishing  effort  of  the  effort  group  concerned 
remains unchanged. 
14. Detailed rules concerning the format and procedure for the 
transmission to the Commission of the information referred 
to  in  paragraphs  3,  and  5  may  be  adopted  by  the 
Commission  by  way  of  implementing  acts  in  accordance 
withthe procedure referred to in Article 32.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 One possibility is to require deployment of a gear that has been shown scientifically to give 
substantial reduction of catch of cod. This could lead to a second clause under Article 
11a.1.(b), this might follow the general form:- 
11a 1 b2) the fishing vessel has only one regulated gear on board, the technical 
attributes of which result in inclusion on list if demonstrated to reduce cod catches 
by 90% or YY% based on scientific experiments and selectivity parameters given. 
MS must report cod catch for derogated fleet. If collective catches by exempted gear 
exceed 1.5% or XX% of TAC, then the basis of the list needs revisiting. 
Where YY is a large % reduction and XX is a small percentage of the TAC. 
Such an approach would have the following advantages: 
Granting of exemptions would be less complicated, more transparent, and more 
equitable across MSs 
Relates directly to reduction of cod catches and thus cod fishing mortality rate 
Does not encourage fishing of other species, though catches of other species may 
change if the gear change affects catches of those species. 
Not directly dependent on MS quota allocation, thus works for all MS.  
and would have the following disadvantages: 
Requires detailed specification of how the gear is to be used. 
Although a gear may reduce overall cod catches by XX% it may actually increase cod 
catches of certain (e.g. young) age classes; selectivity is length-dependent and thus 
reduction is demography-dependent. 
In common with all gear based regulation difficult to define accurately in an effective 
way, and it is essential to verify through monitoring effectiveness in practice. 
The third problem identified by the evaluation is that using the percentage of cod in the total 
catch as an exemption criteriais flawed, because even when percentages of cod in the catch 
are low, these catches can still contribute significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch 
or effort is high or when cod abundance is low. Cod by-catch ceilings expressed as 
percentages of total catch also have a perverse incentive to maintain or increase catches of 
other species. A system based on proportion of total expected cod outtake from the whole 
fishery would be more appropriate, and likely no more difficult to monitor. The proposed 
amendment does not follow this recommendation and retains the flawed % concept in section 
11a1(b): gears whose use would lead to exemption. The EWG extensively considered how 
this criterion could be modified to ensure that it does not allow excessive catch under the 
derogation.  Table 6.2 shows a range of potential options to replace / augment the 1.5% 
exemption criterion currently defined in the new proposed regulation. The table summarises 
the pros and cons for these additional criteria to explain the different possibilities. Some of the 
options are based on the assumption that monitoring of catch for fleets is not required as 
implied by the proposed new Article 11 (see below). Others include a requirement to monitor 
catch. 
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 Table 6.2Options to replace / augment the 1.5% exemption criterion currently defined in the regulation giving 
the pros and cons for these additional criteria.  
Exemption Criteria Pros Cons 
1) Cod catch <1.5% 
of total catch by 
vessel (current 
DGMARE 
proposal) 
Easy to define Is not necessarily related to 
cod fishing mortality rate 
and has the potential to 
allow continued 
exploitation. 
Has the incentive to catch 
more of other species   
2) Cod catch<1.5% or 
XX% of landings 
of all species by 
vessel 
Easy to define 
Does not encourage 
fishing of other species 
Is not necessarily related to 
cod fishing mortality rate 
and has the potential to 
allow continued 
exploitation. 
Is sensitive to changes in 
TACs of other species 
3) Cod catch<1.5 or 
XX% of MS cod 
quota 
Easy to define 
Relates directly to cod 
catches and thus cod 
fishing mortality rate 
Does not encourage 
fishing of other species 
May result in a race for 
operators within a MS to 
fill the limit 1.5 or XX%. 
Threshold would be 
different for each MS and 
may be difficult for some 
MS to work within if the 
MS has only a small quota  
4) Cod catch < A MS 
chosen quota 
allocation.  
Easy to define 
Relates directly to cod 
catches and thus cod 
fishing mortality rate. 
Does not encourage 
fishing of other species. 
Flexible for MS to keep 
fisheries  
Does not necessarily result 
in reduced cod catches  
May be difficult for some 
MS to work within if the 
MS has only a small quota 
but a fleet that catches but 
does not land cod. 
5) Cod <1.5% or 
XX% of landings 
by vessel. 
MS must report cod 
catch for derogated 
fleet. Checks are made 
to ensure that sum of 
derogated fleets is 
sufficiently low.(This 
is option2 including 
Does not encourage 
fishing of other species. 
Flexible for MS to keep 
fisheries 
Not dependent on MS 
quota allocation 
Is not necessarily related to 
cod fishing mortality rate 
and has the potential to 
allow continued 
exploitation. But by 
monitoring total catch this 
will be detected. 
May be considered at 
outside spirit of relative 
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monitoring total catch) 
 
stability. 
 
6) Cod <1.5% or 
XX% of landings 
by vessel. 
MS must report cod 
catch for derogated 
fleet. Council allocates 
part of cod TAC to 
cover this. 
This is option2 
including provision to 
cover this by council 
Relates directly to cod 
catches and thus cod 
fishing mortality rate 
Does not encourage 
fishing of other species. 
Flexible for MS to keep 
fisheries 
Not dependent on MS 
quota allocation, thus 
works for all MS 
More complicated to 
administer. 
May be considered as 
outside relative stability 
(where XX is small percentage) 
STECF reiterates that % of catch or landing (option 1 or 2) could potentially lead to effects 
that oppose the plan’s intention to reduce F on cod. Options 3 and 4 nominally control cod 
catch and are simple for MS to administer but STECF recognises that they might difficult for 
MS if they had insufficient national allocation (option 4). If there is a shortage of allocation 
this could give rise to a race amongst operators to join a derogation group. Finally options 5 
and 6, involve MS reporting total catches, something that would be very beneficial so that it 
was transparent how the derogated fleet was operating. In this context it should also be kept in 
mind that the current proposal for the amendment does not include any requirement for 
monitoring whether the catches in the exempted areas and by the exempted gear remain low. 
Without such monitoring it is not possible to say whether the exemptions continue to be in 
agreement with the plan’s intentions to reduce F on cod. STECF recommends that a 
requirement for periodical (annual) monitoring be added such that it can be verified whether 
the levels of cod catches of exempted vessels still conform to the criteria for entering the 
exemption. STECF is at present not in the position to advise what kind of data would be 
required. Similarly, STECF is at present not in the position to advise on the appropriate data 
and information that Member States shall provide [proposed amendment 11a(7)] “to allow the 
Commission to assess whether an area or a gear shall be on the list of the areas and gears to 
which fishing-effort limitations would not apply, and that detailed rules concerning the format 
and procedure for the transmission to the Commission of the information referred to in 
paragraphs 3 and 5 may be adopted by the Commission by way of implementing acts in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 32”. STECF reiterates that the Tables that 
have been in use for the current requests for exemptions [Commission Regulation (EU) No 
237/210] did not always give sufficient information for STECF to evaluate the requests 
(STECF-PLEN-12-01) and thus posed problems to complete evaluations consistently. 
 
It should be pointed out that the enforcement and implementation of the proposed Article 
11a1(a) could be problematic. It has to be controlled that vessels exclusively fish in areas with 
a depth >=300m during a trip. In particular, along the shelf and along the Norwegian trench 
depth is increasing steeply. Therefore, highly spatially resolved information on fishing 
activities is needed to identify trips where fishing has taken place exclusively in areas with a 
minimum depth of 300m to adjust the effort baselines accordingly but also to control current 
fishing activities. In the current logbook requirements given in EC 1224/2009 Article 14, 
fishermen are only required to report catch from the relevant geographical area in which the 
catches were taken. In the context of depths greater or less than 300m these areas are large 
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and do not correspond to a certain depth above or below 300m. Furthermore, the catch does 
not have to be reported on haul to haul basis. VMS data can be analysed to derive positions, 
however, according to EC 1224/2009 the VMS positions only have to be transmitted every 
two hours making a precise verification of fishing activities difficult. The imprecise 
information in logbooks in combination with space transmissions of VMS does not allow for 
a precise matching of data sources.  The subgroup would like to put forward the following 
alternative to resolve the issues.  
Exempted vessel could be required to report exact position, depth, and duration of each 
haul in logbooks. In addition VMS transmissions should be increased to every 30 
minutes. Adding these requirements will result in additional control costs by adding 
another layer and additional data to the administrative control. The fishing industry 
would also increase their cost in transmitting VMS data. In order to bring the 
Commission to verify whether the exempted trips fulfilled the criteria MS should 
submit raw data on logbook, depth, and VMS from the entire fishing trip.  
Historic data to adjust effort baselines, however, cannot be improved by the more detailed 
data. It is up to the member states to provide sensible estimates of historic effort that would 
have been exempted. As the new Article exempts trips rather than fishing activities of a group 
of vessel during the whole year, it is not possible for STECF to judge on future exemptions 
based on historic fishing patterns. Basing exemptions on fishing trips will increase the burden 
of analysis. 
Finally, STECF observes that the phrasing of proposed amendment 11a(6) “If the fishing 
effort associated with the fishing activity provided for in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b) has not 
contributed to establishment of the baseline effort, then the maximum allowable fishing effort 
of the effort group concerned remains unchanged.” might be incorrect. STECF believes that 
the paragraph is meant to express that “If the fishing effort associated with the fishing activity 
provided for in paragraphs 1(a) or 1(b) has not contributed to establishment of the baseline 
effort, then the baseline fishing effort of the effort group concerned remains unchanged [i.e. 
nothing is deducted as under the condition of proposed amendment 11a(4)]”. 
 
6.3 PROPOSED CHANGES TO ARTICLE 12 
The only part of Article 12 which is subject to alteration in the proposed Commission 
amendment is section 12.4, which currently states: 
4. For aggregated effort groups where the percentage cumulative catch calculated according to 
paragraph 3(b) is equal to or exceeds 20%, annual adjustments shall apply to the effort 
groups concerned. The maximum allowable fishing effort of the groups concerned shall be 
calculated as follows: 
a. where Articles 7 or 8 applies, by applying to the baseline the same percentage 
adjustment as that set out in those Articles for fishing mortality; 
b. where Article 9 applies, by applying to the baseline the same percentage adjustment 
in fishing effort as the reduction of the TAC. 
In the proposed Commission amendment, Article 12.4a remains unchanged.  The following 
table summarises proposed changes to Article 12.4b: 
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Current Article 12.4b: Proposed Commission amendments for Article 12.4b: 
b. where Article 9 applies, by applying to the 
baseline the same percentage adjustment in 
fishing effort as the reduction of the TAC. 
 
b. where Article 9(1) applies, by applying the same 
percentage adjustment in fishing effort as the adjustment of 
the TAC compared with the previous year; [constrained -
25% to +20%] 
c. where Article 9(2)(a) applies, by applying a 15% 
reduction compared to the maximum allowable fishing-
effort allocation for the effort groups concerned in the 
previous year;  
or, if the scientific advice so recommends, 
d. where Article 9(2) applies, by applying up to a 15% 
reduction compared to the maximum allowable fishing-
effort allocation for the effort groups concerned in the 
previous year, together with other appropriate measures. 
 
The relevant proposed amendments to clauses of Article 9, to which Article 12 refers, are as 
follows: 
1. Where there is insufficient information to set the TACs in accordance with Article 7 [Irish 
Sea and Kattegat HCR] or Article 8 [North Sea, Skagerrak, Channel HCR], a TAC shall be 
adopted at the catch level corresponding to the level indicated by scientific advice, provided 
this is no more than 20% greater than or 25% less than the TAC in the previous year. 
2. Where there is insufficient information to set the TACs in accordance with Articles 7, 8 or 
9(1), a TAC shall be adopted at the catch level corresponding to: 
a. a 25% reduction compared to the TAC in the previous year,  
or, if the scientific advice so recommends, 
b. up to a 25% reduction compared to the TAC in the previous year together with other 
appropriate measures. 
In reviewing these changes STECF EWG reached the following conclusions: 
• The proposed amendments are unclear and difficult to follow. 
• It is not clear what differentiates Articles 9.1 and 9.2, upon which Article 12 depends. 
How “insufficient” does information need to be to cause the process to move through 
Article 9.1 onto Article 9.2?  There was a suggestion that a lack of scientific advice 
would cause this, but then Article 9.2b refers back to scientific advice so that cannot be 
a necessary and sufficient condition. 
• There are no suggestions or indications in the regulation at to what is meant by “other 
appropriate measures.” 
• It is possible, under the proposed amendment, that the effort reduction for a stock with 
very poor data is limited to -15%, while a stock with more information can end up with 
a -25% effort reduction.  This seems counter-intuitive as normal practice would be to be 
more precautionary as the information base deteriorates. 
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6.4 PROPOSED CHANGES TO ARTICLE 13 
STECF has given clear support for the principles enshrined in Article 13 which provide for 
direct measures to achieve reductions in cod catches, with the provision for finer scale and 
fisheries specific measures to be introduced to reduce cod catches, rather than proxy (effort) 
and ineffective (TAC) tools (see STECF-11-07; PLEN-12-01). However, evaluation of these 
measures in relation to achieving the desired F reductions under the plan has been 
problematic.  This is because of issues relating to; (a) detecting and disentangling the effects 
of specific and multiple measures implemented simultaneously; (b) a lack of 'control vessels' 
against which to compare the changes in cod catches following the introduction of measures 
(i.e. comparing the catches of participating vessels against non-participating vessels is not 
sufficient, rather comparing against what would have been caught in the absence of the 
measures implemented is necessary), and, (c) a lack of F estimates, or concerns relating to 
retrospective bias and imprecision in F estimates. 
 
In light of these concerns, STECF has recommended catch (landings and discards) control and 
monitoring as an alternative approach to evaluating the effectiveness of cod avoidance 
measures under this Article. This requires advising annually on the change in catch needed by 
fleet segments in order to deliver the F reduction implied by the management plan and then 
monitoring to ensure that catches remain below these levels. 
The Commission has proposed a number of changes to Article 13. From the information 
provided by the Commission, the following changes have been identified; 
 
Current text (1342/2008) Proposed text 
13.. (b) results in a catch composition 
of less than 5 % cod per fishing trip 
(cod-avoiding fishing trips) 
‘(b) that can demonstrate to the Member State 
whose flag it is flying that its fishing activity 
results in a catch composition, including 
discards, of less than 5 % cod over the 
management period.’ 
 
This appears to simply be a clarification between the French language and English language 
regulation (EC Regulation 1342/2008) so that additional effort can be allocated where catches 
of cod are kept to below 5% of total catches for the entire management period (year), and not 
per trip. No substantive changes are therefore proposed to 13(b). 
 
STECF EWG have noted previously that allowing additional activity based on a percentage of 
total catch rather than an absolute limit (as in the retained Article 13(b)) is inappropriate as it; 
(i) may result in significant cod catches where large volume fisheries catch cod as a bycatch 
and this results in significant removals, particularly where the cod stock is depleted; (ii) it 
offers a perverse incentive to catch more of other species in order to reduce the percentage 
catch of cod. If this derogation is to contribute to a reduction in exploitation of cod it is 
important that the total amount of cod caught by vessels under this does not contribute 
significantly to mortality. Therefore there is a need to have an overall cap on the catch of cod 
as a % of the TAC for cod taken by all vessels covered by this derogation. Such an approach 
would require monitoring of total catch, as with fully documented fisheries.  
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STECF EWG notes that there continues to be no requirement to evaluate the impact of this 
Article in terms of its contribution to total cod catches.Monitoring should be required as a 
condition for the derogation.  
There are no further changes suggested to Article 13 by the Commission. However, the 
following points were noted by STECF EWG; 
 
i) Given the suggested introduction of Article 11a, which provides for a mechanism where 
effort does not count against a Member States uptake where fishing takes place with a gear 
approved by STECF to catch less than 1.5% cod, then Article 13(a) which allows additional 
effort for use of gears approved by STECF to catch less than 1% cod (high selective gears) 
becomes redundant and should be removed. 
 
ii) Given the suggested introduction of Article 11a, which provides for the definition of areas 
outside cod distribution where effort does not count against a Member States uptake, the 
retention of Article 13(d) which similarly allows for effort west of a defined area West of 
Scotland, which is considered outside of the cod stock distribution, becomes redundant as 
its provisions can be applied more flexibly in Article 11a. Therefore 13(d) should also be 
removed. 
 
iii) The difficulties in STECF providing advice on the evaluation of changes in partial F 
expected to be delivered by effort reductions as compared to the partial F reductions 
considered to be delivered by vessels taking part in cod avoidance activities under Article 
13(c) were re-emphasised. It is considered that a better approach would be that STECF 
provides advice annually on the total catch (landings + discards) of cod that is expected to 
deliver the reductions in F implied under the cod management plan, and that monitoring 
(through fully documented fisheries or otherwise) ensures that catches remain under this 
limit.This approach provides a simpler and easier to understand approach, and it would be 
easier to verify compliance with the conditions of the derogation. 
 
6.5 CATCH BASED CALCULATIONS FOR USE WHERE F REDUCTION MUST BE ESTIMATED (ARTICLE 13) 
A proposal which uses the same principles and approach as ICES fleet definitions (in terms of 
catch and discards) used by WGMIXFISH is given in Section 6.5.1. The general principle of 
calculations needed to determine catches associated with a defined reduction in F is described in 
section 6.5.2. 
 
6.5.1 HOW TO MOVE FROM AN F-BASED TO A CATCH-BASED EVALUATION OF ARTICLE 13 
STECF has repeatedly underlined the difficulty for stakeholders to evaluate the compliance to 
Article 13 requirements, both for the stakeholders for whom the required data are particularly 
unclear, and for the STECF for whom no standardised evaluation method has been established. 
The main issue noted by STECF is that the plan stipulates that in order to be allowed to buy 
effort back, cod avoidance measures must be demonstrated to yield at least as much reduction 
in Fishing mortality than otherwise would result from effort reduction. This formulation raises 
a number of issues, and in particular the facts that 1) fishing mortality estimate is linked to the 
dynamics of the entire fishery, and therefore it is very difficult to monitor the beneficial effects 
of actions taken by only a subset of the fleet, 2) fishing mortality can only be monitored 
indirectly and ex-post through the use of an assessment model, and therefore the estimates are 
only available the year after the actions have taken place and 3) fishing mortality is a fairly 
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abstract concept that the industry cannot monitor and manage directly, and which doesn’t have 
proportional relationship to catches.  
 
Therefore, STECF (2011) argued that such F-based criteria should be replaced by more 
tangible and directly available criteria based on catches. The following text is a pragmatic 
recipe for performing a direct planning and evaluation of Article 13for a given fleet Fl.  
• It is understood that the TAC for next year (TACy+1), expressed in tonnes, results from the 2 
years projection of a stock assessment performed in the current year (y), in order to achieve a 
given target F which itself is related to stock numbers at age. The linkage between TACy+1 and 
the actual Fy+1 that will happen next year is imperfect, as it is based on a number of 
assumptions on e.g. future recruitment, selectivity and growth. Therefore Article 13 cannot be 
evaluated on the basis of the true Fy+1 for the TAC year as this one is not known yet, but only 
on the basis of the assumed (and thus known) projected Fprojy+1 which corresponds to the 
TAC. If the TAC is set according to the scientific advice, then Fprojy+1 is the same as used as 
the basis for advice. Otherwise, it is necessary to re-estimate the F from the TAC. 
• Then it is necessary to know the quota share of the TAC for the fleet Fl. As the exact 
information on quota distribution is most often not readily available, a simple assumption could 
be to use the share of landings from that fleet to the total landings of the stock during the 
previous data year, as a proxy for the relative stability share of the nation where the fleet Fl 
belongs, plus the subsequent quota swaps and national quota distribution schemes. However, 
there is a risk of distortion and perverse incentives if the fleet has sold some of its quota. 
Therefore, it would be preferable that the fleet Fl would have the responsibility to document its 
actual quota share. This quota share is then assumed to be the projected landings that the fleet 
Fl will yield during the year (Ly+1,Fl). 
• Then it is necessary to estimate the discards for the fleet Fl (Dy+1,Fl). As a basic principle, the 
best estimates of discards ratios to landings available, coming from the European Data 
Collection Framework and for the year y-1 will be used (Dy+1,Fl=Ly+1,Fl*DRy-1,Fl), as it is 
understood that the scientific institutes may not have the resources for monitoring specifically 
the exact discard figures of the fleet Fl. As above, it is the responsibility of the fleet Fl to 
document if its discard estimates are different. An evident caveat is the assumption of stable 
discards patterns between the last data year (y-1) and the TAC year, which can be violated in 
case of strong year classes entering the fishery. However, there is little way around this issue, 
and it is also the standard practice to use recent discards estimates in the short-term projection 
in single-stock advice. Alternatively, a longer-term average (3 to 5 years) can be preferred. It is 
considered preferable to match the method chosen to the approach in terms of years and ages 
used by ICES to advise on TAC options.  
• Ideally, landings and discards estimates will need to be estimated by age. It is not desirable to 
proceed with bulk weight estimates, although it is of course possible (see also section 6.5.1).  
• Once projected landings and discards (i.e. catches Cy+1,Fl) estimates are known, it is possible to 
estimate a projected partial F from the fleet Fl Fprojy+1,Fl=Fprojy+1*Cy+1,Fl/Cy+1.. At this stage, 
the reduction target from the management plan can be translated into catch equivalent for the 
fleet Fl. 
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This catch reduction is therefore the target imposed on the fleet in order to obtain an Article 13 
exemption for the TAC year. 
This scheme could be applied appropriately for full buy back of effort or reduced buy back if 
required. 
When the new assessment becomes available (typically during the mid-year of the current 
year), it might be possible to perform an update of the catch reduction target for the second 
semester, if the basis for F reduction has been revised. 
Finally, at the end of the TAC year, an MS should carry out an evaluation of the actual 
achievement.  MS are expected to collect sufficient data on the catch (discards and landings) to 
carry out and submit the necessary evaluation. If the fleet can be shown to have complied with 
the catch restriction, then this should be considered sufficient compliance.  If insufficient data 
is collected to allow STECF to evaluate compliance, adjustments to the effort allocation would 
be expected. 
6.5.2 CALCULATING THE TOTAL IMPACT (IN TERMS OF TOTAL ALLOCATED FISHING MORTALITY) OF 
TAC ADVICE BY FLEET SEGMENT 
This section deals with how to calculate the total impact (in terms of total allocated) of TAC 
advice by fleet segment. This will allow the total catch (landings + discards) that a fleet 
segment should keep within to be consistent with the F intended by the management plan. 
In order to calculate a TAC, the management plan needs to apportion fishing mortality into 
appropriate components, and uses the component associated with landings in this calculation. 
Where fishing mortality is apportioned into allocated and unallocated mortality, and these 
estimates are provided from an assessment, the unallocated mortality is treated in the same 
manner as natural mortality in any calculations. At the stock level, the TAC formula would be 
as follows: 
 
where a represents age,  the mean weight of landed fish,  the number of fish in the 
population,  the landing fraction,  the allocated fishing mortality,  the unallocated 
fishing mortality, and  the natural mortality. 
The formula to break it down to fleet level (done at the level of age) is as follows: 
 
where, in addition to the above,  reflects relative stability (splitting quota by nation),  the 
split of the quota within a nation between fleet segments, and  the landing fraction within 
a nation and fleet. 
The associated discards would then be: 
 
where, in addition to the above,  the mean weight of discarded fish 
Given the above equations for landings and discards, discards can be expressed as a function of 
landings as follows: 
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This expression can be used to calculate the discards at age to be expected in any fleet segment 
that would be consistent with the fishing mortality intended by the TAC that has been set. 
 
Caveats: 
In the above formulation, the following simplification is made: and . 
This is thought to be a reasonable assumption. Other simplifications are possible (e.g. 
collapsing age), but would probably require sensitivity analyses before being judged 
acceptable.  
 
6.6 PROPOSED CHANGES TO ARTICLE 14 
 
Article 14 provides for the allocation of fishing effort by a Member State to vessels or groups 
of vessels within the gear groups ceiling in such a way that rewards “good fishing practices”, 
e.g. data collection enhancement, discard reduction, fuel efficiency etc.. 
 
The Commission have proposed two amendments to this Article; 
 
Current text (1342/2008) Proposed text 
NEW ‘6. Where the scientific data indicate that more 
than [10 %] of the total cod catches for a 
particular effort group are attributed to discards, 
or where the quota allocation does not 
correspond to the expected catches and would 
likely result in cod discards, the Member State 
concerned shall take immediate measures to 
minimise cod discards. 
 
STECF previously considered a suggestion from the Commission that an option for adjusting 
the implementation of Article 13(a) to overcome problems of low percentages leading to high 
absolute cod catches. In the case considered this was a secondary condition where there was a 
maximum 5% discard rate allowed of the cod catch in order to ensure that it did not lead to 
excessive cod catches. This new Article introduces a new requirement on Member States to 
take additional measures where discard rates are considered high for a particular gear group. 
However, whilst this is an improvement in that action by the MS is required this measure 
results in the same issues as highlighted in the STECF EWG 11-07  in that it i) leads to issues 
of discard estimation, and ii) permits continuation of discarding. 
 
Currently proposals for CFP reform and management changes in general include a number of 
changes regarding a requirement to land all catches of cod and also some other species. Its not 
clear yet what the conditions and timescale of all these changes will be, however, it is likely 
that these measures will improve the situation regarding monitoring of catch and may give 
opportunities for improved compliance if implemented effectively. 
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Further, the implementation of the new Article 14.6 is problematic. A reallocation of quota is 
difficult in member states where relative stability / fixed allocation exists in some form also 
inside the country (e.g. Germany and Ireland…). The current draft could be interpreted in a 
way that quota could be reallocated towards fisheries with high cod bycatches. Fisheries that 
currently avoid bycatch of cod would need to give quota to fisheries with high cod bycatches. 
This would create perverse incentives by rewarding those with higher discard rates. Next to 
this it is not clear what exactly is -meant by ‘discard’. Discard can be fish below minimum 
landings size or marketable fish. Under the current CFP only discard of marketable fish can 
be reduced by reallocating quotas in a sensible way. Under a discard ban this Article 
potentially becomes redundant. 
 
 
Current text (1342/2008) Proposed text 
NEW 7. Member States shall establish and include in 
their national control action programmes, as 
prescribed in Article 46 of Regulation 
1224/2009, systems to ensure compliance with 
the conditions referred to in Articles 11a, 11b 
and 13. Member States shall assign a ‘very high 
risk’ level to those vessels in their risk-based 
management as described in Article 5(3) of 
Regulation 1224/2209.’ 
 
It was considered that this addition was not within the remit of the group as it relates to 
control issues and allocation of resources within the competence of Member States, and 
therefore no comment is made. 
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1 Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 This position paper is the North Sea RAC contribution to the STECF Expert Working 
Group (EWG 12-07) on Multi-Annual Management Plans that will meet in Edinburgh on 
18th -22nd June 2012.The paper builds on earlier advice presented as part of the 
ICES/STECF evaluation on the EU Cod Management Plan (EC 1342/2088). 
 
2. Long Term Management Plans 
 
2.1 The NSRAC agrees that setting long term objectives and moving progressively towards 
them has been an important and positive step forward in the management of North Sea 
demersal stocks.  This move away from ad hoc decisions on TACs and other measures 
has provideda greater degree of stability and coherence. However, there is some 
considerable way to go before we will have moved the full distance from the limited set 
of harvest control rules from the EU Norway negotiation process, to the comprehensive, 
participative, and well considered management plans that we all aspire to. 
 
2.2 The NSRAC been preparing advice on LTMPs since 2005 and has produced draft 
advice for the North Sea Nephrops fishery that is still under discussion. This work, of 
value in itself, also provides an indication of the range of biological, socio-economic, 
ecosystem and fisheries management issues that should be addressed in developing a 
comprehensive management plan with a high degree of stakeholder involvement. 
 
2.3 Our perception is that within the CFP generally, and within the two plans aimed at 
rebuilding the cod stocks within the cod recovery zone (EC 1342/2008 and EC 
50 
423/2004), there has been overemphasis on targets at the expense of delivery and 
implementation mechanisms. The “fisheries response” to management measures is 
critical, yet has not been accorded sufficient attention. The result of all the actions so far 
by the Commission, as spelt out in previous NSRAC advice has been a series of 
uncoordinated and sometimes inconsistent and contradictory measures that have largely 
failed to achieve their objectives, or have done so in a way that has generated 
unacceptable collateral damage. 
 
2.4 The North Sea fisheries are multi-faceted, multi-species, multi-gear and multi 
jurisdiction. As a consequence, stakeholder involvement is imperativefor the effective 
design, development and the implementation stages of all long term management plans. 
   
3. Fishing Mortality 
 
3.1  ICES advice for cod in 2011 indicated that: 
 
• There has been a gradual improvement in the status of the cod stock in the North 
Sea in recent years 
 
• Fishing mortality declined from 2000 but is well above FMSY and is just above 
FPA 
 
• Spawning Stock Biomass has increased from an historic low in 2006 but remains 
below BLIM 
 
• Recruitment since 2000 has been poor possibly due to the influence of food 
supply for cod 
 
• Although discards are still high there has been a decreasing trend since 2008 
 
3.2 The STECF evaluation of the EU Cod Plan concluded that the rate of decline in fishing 
mortality on cod has been shallower under the Cod Management Plan in comparison 
with the Cod Recovery Plan, despite the progressive and large annual reductions in 
fishing effort required under the former. Although it is difficult to differentiate between the 
effects of different management measures it seems likely that the reduction in capacity 
of the fleets fishing for demersal stocks in the North Sea during 2003-2007 was a 
significant factor in reducing fishing mortality. 
 
3.3 A major source of mortality remains the discarding of cod.Following the introduction of 
various landing controls, cod landings are now fully recorded. The focus of management 
and stock rebuilding efforts must necessarily fall on reducing the unwanted mortality 
associated with discards of cod in the various North Sea demersal fisheries. 
 
4 Effort and Fishing Mortality 
 
4.1 Notwithstanding the above, it is fair to say that there remain uncertainties in the present 
ICES estimates of fishing mortality. The relative contributions of discards, landings, 
unaccounted removals, seal predation and recreational fishing are especially uncertain. 
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4.2 Similarly, the apparently weak link between reductions in fishing effort and fishing 
mortality, identified by STECF in its evaluation, raises an important question over the 
role that effort control can play, given the difficulties in implementing those controls. 
Effort control has also been overlaid over a system of TAC constraints. The NSRAC has 
spelled out in its earlier advice why it considers that effort control has been an obstacle 
to rapid rebuilding of the cod stocks rather than providing a positive contribution. The 
role of exemptions from the effort regime as an incentive to various kinds of cod 
avoidance is unarguable but we ask whether this could be replaced by other forms of 
incentive, notably the transfer of fish resources from the ICES discards column to the 
landings column in return for commitments to specific cod avoidance/discard reduction 
measures. 
 
5 Discards 
 
5.1 Reducing discards of cod and thereby reducing unwanted fishing mortality on cod 
should be taken into account in the formulation of any new multi-annual plan. The 
provisions in Article 13 of the EU Cod Management Plan for tailored, incentivised cod 
avoidance and discard reduction provided a ground breaking development that opened 
the way for a number of successful initiatives.  These included real time closures, Catch 
Quota trials and various kinds of gear selectivity. Discussion of ‘Fully Documented 
Fisheries’, in which the whole catch is recorded and verified, should be promoted and 
considered as anopportunity for delivering different incentives linked to effective cod 
avoidance/discard reduction initiatives.  Debate should not simply be limited to a 
discussion ofthe introduction of CCTV cameras on board vessels.  
 
6 Multi-species aspects 
 
6.1 Although ICES work on the provision of advice based on multi-species assessments in 
mixed fisheries for North Sea demersal stocks is still at an early stage it is appropriate 
for the NSRAC to make the following observations: 
 
• Multi-species interactions are likely to be significant within mixed fisheries 
 
• Trade-offs between the interests of different fisheries will be necessary to arrive 
at balanced harvest control rules 
 
• We are managing fisheries within a dynamic stock and fisheries context where it 
cannot be assumed that conditions next year or the year after will be the same 
as last year.  
 
• The ‘fisheries response’ to management measures is likely to be a pivotal factor 
and this is likely to be driven primarily by economic considerations.  Fisheries 
cannot adapt every year to changing circumstances.  
 
• Multi-species interactions require political decisions before management can be 
carried out. Whether the target is to maximize fish biomass, economic value or 
social benefits (jobs) has to be defined.  Extensive stakeholder consultation will 
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be necessary before a multi-species-plan for a region can replace multiple 
single-stock-MSY based plans.  
 
 
7 MSY in Mixed Fisheries 
 
7.1 NSRAC work is in progress on multi-species and mixed fishery dimensions of 
multiannual management plans. We are acutely aware however that the concept of MSY 
has limited relevance to multi-species and multi-gear fisheries beyond anoverall 
aspiration to deliver high long-term sustainable stocks and yields whilst providing 
adequate protection for vulnerable stocks and species. 
 
7.2 What is clear is that although many demersal North sea stocks are already in the region 
of MSY (understood as a range rather than a precise point on the effort/yield curve) 
managers require a pragmatic and flexible framework that encourages movement in the 
right direction rather than a rigid and prescriptive set of harvest control rules. 
 
8 Multi-Gear Dimensions 
 
8.1 We would draw attention, within the context of demersal stocks in the North Sea, to the 
significance of ‘economic driver’ species that to a large degree determine vessels’ 
fishing patterns and behaviours: Some of the more important driver species in addition 
to cod are, for example: 
 
   Anglerfish/megrim                    
Sole 
Plaice 
Nephrops 
Saithe 
Haddock 
Whiting 
Lemon Sole 
   
8.2 An effective approach to management measures must move away from blanket 
measures that rely on an assumption that all parts of the fleet respond to management 
measures in a uniform way. In practice, even those parts of the demersal fleet that catch 
varying quantities of cod are driven by different considerations - largely related to their 
economic driver species. 
 
9. Necessary Features of a Long Term Management Plan 
 
9.1 On the basis of our experience of the EU Cod Recovery Plan (2004-07) and the EU Cod 
Management Plan (2008 – present) it is possible to draw up an inventory of the features 
that we consider important for inclusion in a new plan (or plans) for North Sea demersal 
stocks. The plans in our view should: 
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• Be developed and implemented within a participatory framework which allows 
fisheries managers, scientists and fisheries stakeholders to work together to 
develop objectives, timeframes and measures and to cooperate closely on the 
implementation and delivery of the provisions of the plans. 
• Have a regional seas focus, reflecting the specific characteristics of the fleets, 
ecosystems and fisheries dynamics in an area like the North Sea. There are 
different stock dynamics in the North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea and 
different fleet characteristics.  We are open to discussion on the parameters of 
the North Sea area and whether sub areas within the North Sea should be used 
for zoning or differential management measures.   
• Management measures should be tailored to the specifics of the fisheries.  For 
example, it is evident that a different management approach is needed when cod 
are recovering, and appearingin catches in greater numbers,than when the stock 
is in decline. 
• Focus on discard reduction, as this is likely to deliver the largest returns in terms 
of reducing overall fishing mortality. 
• Focus management measures on outcomes rather than overly prescriptive 
detailed legislation, as stakeholders can agree on the delivery of targets at 
regional/fisheries level. 
• Ensure that all catches are registered for the main economic driver species. 
• As far as possible,align economic incentives within the fishery with the objectives 
of the Plan. 
• Be adaptive: obvious deficiencies in the plan should be addressed rapidly 
through flexible review arrangements, without undermining overall commitment 
to the plan objectives. 
• Move away from blunt measures such as effort control, towards tailored 
avoidance and discard reduction measures. 
• Develop a toolbox approach that allows scope for member states and fishing 
vessels to select the best means of achieving the plan’s objectives. 
•  Minimise conflicts inconsistencies and perverse effects arising from overlapping 
management plans; in particular remove measures that result in reduced 
selectivity.   
• Recognise that by-catch can embrace both discards (undesirable mortality) 
and/or a catch of a valuable subsidiary species. It is discards that need to be 
reduced (as a source of undesirable mortality), not by-catch per se. 
•  Be aligned with the main direction of CFP reforms and in particular: 
regionalisation, discard reduction, and the integration of fisheries and 
environmental objectives; the potential role for member states and the RACs 
(ACS) to work together on multi-annual management plans on a regional basis 
should be taken into account as should the necessity to integrate Norwegian 
stakeholders into the dialogue on the content of the plan(s). 
•  Strike an appropriate balance between delivering healthy stocks with high, 
sustainable, long term yields for the main commercial species with providing 
targeted and appropriate protection for vulnerable stocks and species. 
•  Take practicable steps towards an ecosystem and multi-species approach, 
recognising that as yet both are poorly defined. 
•  Avoid constraining fisheries and fishing activities that catch minimalquantities of 
the species being managed. 
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10 Interim Regime 
 
10.1  NSRAC priorities for the interim period pending agreement on a new comprehensive Multi‐
Annual Plan for cod, to be agreed through co‐decision, are as follows: 
 
• An pause or freeze on effort controls 
 
• Measures tailored to the characteristics of the fisheries concerned, the conservation status of 
the stocks, the quality of the scientific assessments and the stock dynamics. The Cod 
Management Plan suffers from being a blanket, top‐down approach.  A differentiated 
approach would be more successful.  The West of Scotland and Irish Sea are clearly different 
from the North Sea. 
 
• A simpler and clearer route for groups of vessels seeking exemption from the effort regime  
 
• Freeing up those fleet sectors that have become victims of the plan. Sectors that do not target 
cod and have very low annual by catches of cod, but where effort levels are cut as a result of 
perverse incentives 
• Progress begun under the buyback/cod avoidance/discard reduction provisions are promising 
and should be encouraged and developed 
 
• In the North Sea a focus on discard reduction is likely to be the most immediate and effective 
means to reduce unwanted cod mortality 
 
• We support management measures to improve cod and other stocks but recognise that here is 
no guarantee that any management measures will necessarily be successful against a 
background of high levels of natural mortality and major change in environmental conditions. 
 
• In some cases improvements to the cod recovery regime could be brought about through 
improvements to the procedures rather than the legal text, with protocols indicating clearly 
what is required of the member states, STECF and the industry. 
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ANNEX II POSITION PAPER FROM NORTH WESTERN WATERS RAC 
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ANNEX III EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT OPTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE 
Background 
The evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Kattegat, North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland 
carried out by STECF in July 2011 indicated that landings quotas and effort were unlikely to deliver 
the objectives of the plans over the next few years. A number of issues were identified, in particular 
that landings quotas were unable to constrain catches of cod in these areas and that overall effort 
restrictions were having impacts well beyond the cod fisheries without yet delivering reductions in cod 
mortality.  
The STECF group that is reviewing the past performance and preparing options for the European 
Commission for the future is considering a range of management options. This working paper ranks 
the management options based on expected compliance and their effect on enforcement.   
Management measures suggested by the STECF 
The candidate management measures suggested by the STECF for the NS included the following: 
1. The current plan: Continued use of the basis of the current plan (landings TACs, effort control 
with derogations) but with simplified and more consistent derogations for fleets reducing cod 
catch. 
2. Mixed fishery landings quotas:  Mixed fishery landings quotas matched across species. 
3. Mixed fishery catch quotas: Mixed fishery catch quotas matched across species with in year 
increases if catches of cod kept below limits. 
4. Individual vessel/business catch quotas: A system of individual vessel/business catch quotas set 
at single species level but tie up once any quota is exhausted.   
5. Real time effort incentives:  Effort based real time incentives (RTI) based on spatial effort 
allocations where effort is expended at different rates for more critical areas 
 
For candidate measures 2-5 the options would involve: 
• Setting of mixed-fishery TACsfor fisheries at the European level – agreed by Member States. 
These would be TACs for individual stocks which are set in a way that accounts for the fact 
that the different stocks are caught together in mixed-fisheries. 
• Operation/implementation for landings or catches at or below the target at Regional/MS level. 
• Where catches are to be controlled, fishermen must agree to that it is their responsibility to 
show that they are catching under the limits. 
• As a general principle non-compliance must carry sufficiently appropriate ‘penalties’.  
o This may involve specific contracts between licensees and MS authorities 
o Minor over-catch that is declared should be dealt with by banking and borrowing (i.e.  
max 10 %) for vessels between years at MS level, and not considered an offence. This 
also requires that borrowing/banking is permitted between the MS and the EU.  
o Non-compliance that does not result in excess/inappropriate catch could be dealt with 
initially by low penalties, which would be raised for repeated offences. 
o Non-compliance which results in significant false/under declaration of catch should 
have penalties set taking the probability of detection into consideration as well as the 
potential financial gain detected, including removal of future fishing opportunities.  
o Excessive penalties would be unfair and unreasonable but failure to have sufficiently 
stringent penalties will incentivize non-compliance.  
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 Method for analysis  
Each of the five management options was broken down into management components which were then 
evaluated from an ‘enforcement’ perspective using the following criteria. For example, when looking 
at option 1 (Continued use of the current plan) the following management measures were addressed: 
• Landings quotas 
• Effortlimitations 
• Individual fishing opportunities (to reward business that undershoots catches etc.) 
• ”Borrowing/Banking” (MS to Commission and within MS between years) 
• Technical measures  
 
The below enforcement questions were addressed for each of the management components: 
• Controllability - is the management measure possible to control? 
• Enforcement tools - how shall the management measure be controlled? 
• Cost-effectiveness - Is the control measure cost effective?  
• Compliance - What are the requirements for compliance to the management measure?  
• Infringement -What are the types of infringements that can occur in relation to the management 
measure?  
• Obstacles - Are there any obstacles faced by fisherman in terms of compliance with the 
management measure? 
• Incentives - Can incentives for compliance be created?  
 
Many of the management components are repeated in more than one of the management measures. 
In the end eight management components were identified and included in the analysis: 
• Landing quotas 
• Catch quota management (CQM)  
• Effortlimitations 
• Individual fishing opportunities 
• ”Borrowing/Banking” (MS to KOM and between vessels in MS) 
• Technical measures  
• Discard ban vs. fully documented fisheries 
• Mixed fisheries landings quotas 
• Mixed fishery catch quotas 
 
Ranking of management measures  
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Looking at the five management measures suggested by the STECF it is evident that management 
measure 2 and 3 are parts of measure 1, 4 or 5.  
 
Option 1 (continued use of the current plan) has the benefit of already being in place, i.e. systems have 
been put in place and the industry and authorities have adapted to the change. However, from 
enforcement point of view the fewer elements the system contains the less will the enforcement 
resources be dispersed. To include two controlling mechanisms such as landings quotas and effort is 
therefore not favoured.  
 
Option 5 (effort based RTIs) has not been considered due to uncertainty of how effort is translated into 
quotas and vice versa.   
 
Option 4 (Individual vessel/business catch quotas set at single species level but tied up once any quota 
is exhausted) is the preferred management measure when enforcement and incentives for compliance 
is considered.  
The management components of management option 4 as suggested by STECF and some added 
management options are analysed below. The measures include the following management 
components: 
1. Catch quota management (CQM) and fully documented fisheries (FDF) 
2. Individual vessel/business catch quotas 
3. Time and area measures 
 
Results  
For each of the management components of management option 4 the enforcement questions stated 
above are addressed.  
1.Catch quota management (CQM) and fully documented fisheries (FDF) 
In the catch quota management scheme all catches are deducted from the vessel quota. When the 
vessel quota is exhausted the vessel has to cease fishing in the area.  
The enforcement problem consists of ensuring that the fisher fully document the extraction from the 
resource, i.e. that all catches are being reported in the logbook as either landings or discards (FDF). 
Whether the catch is being discarded or not, in itself, makes no difference as long as the quality and 
reliability of the recorded catch composition can be ensured. However, the cost and efficiency of the 
enforcement tools used to enforce the management system will vary depending on whether or not 
discarding is regulated.  
 
Controllability, cost-effectiveness and infringements  
The CQM and FDF can be regulated in combination with a full discard ban, a discard ban with 
exempted species and without a discard ban but where catches and discards are reported in the 
logbook. The table below illustrates the effect on enforcement and compliance of these options:  
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Verification 
needed 
That no catch is discarded. 
 
That no catch of included 
species is discarded (possibly 
by species and quantity). 
 
Quantity and species  
discarded of exempted  
species. 
 
Quantity and species  
discarded. 
Reporting  Logbook = catch  
Landingsdeclaration = catch  
Logbook = catch + discards 
Landings declaration =  
catch – allowed discards 
Logbook = catch + discards 
Landings declaration =  
catch - discards 
 
Infringement Discard ban  Discard ban and misreporting Misreporting  
No discard ban  Discard ban with 
exempted species
Full discard ban  
FDF  
Catch quotas 
E
f
t
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Confidence in  
catch levels 
(1 highest) 
1 2* 3 
Cost  
(1 highest)  
3 2* 1 
 
* If exempted species are only present in some fisheries and/or are very different in size etc. from other 
catch, controllability is improved.  
 
All options are difficult to enforce but as the table illustrates, a full discard ban is clearly superior to 
the other alternatives from an enforcement perspective. In addition to achieving the greatest confidence 
in catch levels it is also the least difficult as well as the most cost-effective option to enforce. 
 
Enforcement tools 
Controlling a FDF system in combination with any of the options for regulating discarding practices 
requires monitoring of the fishing activity at sea where the discarding takes place. There are four 
enforcement tools that allow for that; on board observers, patrol vessels, aircraft and CCTV-systems 
(sensors, GPS, cameras). Other enforcement tools such as landings and administrative controls can be 
used to identify irregularities in the length and catch composition that indicates that discarding has 
taken place.  
CCTV-systems can provide coverage of the entire fishing activities for a fraction of the cost of other 
enforcement tools at sea. For this reason it is a superior tool from an enforcement perspective while 
also providing highly useful information on the fishing activity through electronic sensor and GPS5 
data. 
As is the case for most enforcement tools the CCTV systems should be implemented and applied based 
on risk analysis. For example, time spent on analysing footage could differ depending on the whether 
the vessel is operating in risk areas etc.  
 
The design of a CCTV-system must consider personal integrity aspects.  
 
Obstacles  
In a CQM that includes a discard ban the fishermen could face problems to store fish, as well as 
handling of by-catch on board and at shore. These issues should be addressed and solves as far as 
possible before the introduction of the management system.  
 
Incentives 
Higher precision of catch data should allow the authorities to decrease buffers to hedge for uncertainty 
in catch estimations which in turn can lead to higher quotas. Another incentive of using the system 
could be to grant CCTV vessels access to some closed areas and to be exempted from certain landings 
obligations.  
                                                 
55 can provide geographical position every 10 seconds  
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In a CCTV system the quality and amount of fisheries data that is available for the authorities will 
increase drastically. It is therefore of outmost importance that a review of all management measures 
that the fisher is operating under is carried so that redundant measures can be removed.  
 
Operating under a CCTV system could potentially improve the acceptance of fishing practice among 
the public which in turn potentially can increase the demand for fisheries products. 
 
Compliance  
The CCTV-system would improve compliance of reporting rules as well as any potential discard ban. 
However, a system of CQM with some type of discard ban cannot be successful if the right 
surrounding measures are not in place. Systems for receiving undersized or unwanted catch in 
harbours, rules of conducts etc. has to be developed so that compliance is not hindered.  
 
If only part of the fleet is equipped with CCTV, a sense of unfairness that potentially could influence 
compliance, could be created. This has to be considered alongside the benefits of equipping only parts 
of the fleet based on a risk based approach.  
 
2. Individual vessel/business catch quotas 
 
An allocation of quotas to the individual vessel/business level allows the fishermen to fully bear the 
benefits of complying with the rules as well as directly bear the cost of any illegal activity.  Vessels 
must cease to operate when first quota is exhausted.  
 
Controllability, enforcement tools, infringements and cost-efficiency  
The enforcement problem consists of ensuring that the catch is reported accurately and counted in the 
quotas. By introducing a FDF-system that is primarily controlled by a CCTV-system in combination 
with other enforcement tools such as landings control, this can be achieved. 
 
From an enforcement perspective individual quotas are preferred over collective quotas since it allows 
the fishermen to fully bear the benefits of complying with the rules as well as directly bearing the cost 
of any illegal activity.   
 
Compliance 
The initial allocation of quotas is an important key to achieve compliance. In fisheries with a large 
overcapacity the initial allocation is difficult. Furthermore, the allocation of choke species in fisheries 
where the national quota of the species is very small, due to the relative stability, is difficult. 
 
The system could allow for possibilities to cover unexpected catch after the fishing trip by buying or 
renting.  This is necessary to provide flexibility for the fishers but adds to some extent to the control 
burden of authorities. This system requires flexibility between the MS and the EU in a system of 
borrowing and saving between years. 
 
Incentives  
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The risk of withdrawal of the individual fishing quota with all the economic consequences that means 
for the fisherman should be a strong incentive for compliance. This does of course require a legal 
system that allow for that type of legal action. 
 
Obstacles  
Choke species that cannot be obtained on the market due to a too small or no national allocation in 
relation to the abundance of the fish could hinder compliance. This is a problem of relative stability 
which is not addressed here.  
 
 
3. Gear, area and time measures  
 
To limit discarding the technical measures in place have to support and allow for a selective fishery.  
 
Controllability, enforcement tools and cost efficiency 
In the North Sea these measures have the benefit of already being in place, i.e. systems have been put 
in place and the industry and authorities have adapted to the change. 
 
Controls on area and time measures (e.g. seasonal and/or areas closures) are to a large extent carried 
out at sea using patrol vessels and aircraft. Other tools used are VMS and GPS systems to track where 
the fishing activity takes place. 
 
Time or area closures, without exception, are preferred to technical regulations since it makes control 
at sea easier and more cost-effective. In general limiting regulations such as ‘one net’ rules and fishing 
in specific limited areas per trip ease the control burden.  
 
Compliance  
The usage of certain gears might not be economically optimal which might drive non-compliance.  
 
Obstacles  
In the case of area and time measures the measure could create obstacles for the fisheries if transiting 
over large areas are necessary.  
 
Incentives  
One way of providing incentives for selective fishing could be to reward additional quotas for the 
usage of certain gears.  
 
Concluding remarks on enforcement  
From an enforcement perspective a slightly modified version of the individual vessel/business option 
should be implemented for the NS. The management option includes primarily a catch quota 
management (CQM) system in which the quotas are allocated to the individual fisherman or business.   
The accuracy of the reported catch is ensured by CCTV systems within the framework of a fully 
documented fishery (FDF).   
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In order for the management option to achieve its objectives it is important that the effect on 
compliance and enforcement of the entire system of management measures is considered.  From this 
perspective it is crucial that the control measures: 
 
• are harmonized over regions and MS as far as possible to avoid actual or perceived unfairness. 
• are kept to a minimum to avoid spreading limited control funds over a large number of  
measures.  
• ensure that the fishers receive the benefits of complying with the rules as well as the bearing 
the costs of non-compliance.  
• carry appropriate penalties for non-compliance; failure to have sufficiently stringent penalties 
could incentivize non-compliance.  
• consider  incentives for  fishers to comply with the rules. 
• are stable over time (as far as possible) to avoid confusion and mistakes.  
• are understood and accepted by the industry   
• are applied in the most cost- efficient way using the appropriate tools and intensity to control 
each management option. 
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ANNEX IV SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT OPTIONS – VIEWS OF VESSEL OWNERS/OPERATORS 
John Powell, CCRI. 
 
An on-line questionnaire was developed to explore views of vessel owners/operators to four different 
management options.  The survey was conducted during May 2012 using Bristol On-line software, but 
only 19 useable responses were received.  Of these all respondents operate in the North Sea, 4 in the 
West of Scotland, 2 in Eastern Channel, and 4 in other areas.  A total of 12 respondents were targeting 
Cod, and other key species include haddock, saithe, whiting, and monkfish.   
 
Figure 1: Species targeted by respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
The management approaches were described as follows: 
 
Management Approach 1: 
• Continue the current management plan (landing TACs, effort controls) 
• Simplified derogations for fleets reducing cod catch  
 
Management approach 2:  
• Mixed fishery catch quotas reduced to match across species 
• In-year increases if Cod catches are kept below limits  
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 Management Approach 3:  
• Individual vessel/business catch quotas set at single species level 
• Vessel must tie up once any single quota is exhausted  
 
Management Approach 4:  
• Effort based real-time incentives 
• Each vessel allocated ‘fishing credits’ 
 
Each approach was explained more fully in the questionnaire using a sketch of a fishing boat and short 
summaries highlighting key aspects of the proposed management regime.  Each management approach 
was described using the bare minimum of information to get across the main aspects of the approach.  
One example is illustrated below in Figure 1 (for Option 1).  The same set of questions was asked 
about each management approach in turn to obtain respondent views on whether the approach would 
be more difficult, no different, or easier than the current situation for the following activities: 
 
• Managing my fishing effort 
• Controlling costs 
• Managing my Cod quota 
• Managing my quota for other species  
• Reducing discards of Cod 
• Reducing discards of other species 
• Using my knowledge and judgement about when and where to fish 
• Fish safely  
• Adapting my effort to the weather and other environmental conditions 
Respondents were also asked to indicate potential financial impacts (i.e. changes in annual income, 
profit, input costs (fuel, supplies, new gear, repairs), and number and type of crew employed), and 
provide an indication of how difficult they felt it would be to enforce the approach. 
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Figure 2: Presentation of Option 1 in the questionnaire 
 
 
 
Results 
The impacts of Option 1 were viewed as not having much impact from the current situation.  The 
majority of respondents indicated no difference to their activities, although 8 respondents indicated it 
would have a negative impact on managing fishing effort and managing their Cod quota.   
 
Figure 3: Impacts of proposed management Option 1 
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Option 3 (Individual vessel/business catch quotas set at single species level; vessel must tie up once 
any single quota is exhausted) was viewed as the least favourable approach.  More than half of 
respondents indicated that under this option the following activities would be more difficult: 
• Managing my fishing effort 
• Managing my Cod quota 
• Managing my quota for other species  
• Reducing discards of Cod 
• Reducing discards of other species 
In addition more than half of all respondents indicated fishing safely and adapting to weather and 
conditions would be no different.  More than half of respondents indicated the approach would have a 
negative impact on annual income and profit. Five respondents indicated that managing effort, cod 
quota and cod discards would be easier, and four indicated a positive impact on annual income from 
fishing activities.   
 
Figure 4: Impacts of Option 3 
 
 
 
When asked for specific opinions on the approach the focus of respondents was on the impact of the 
quota issue on their activities.  Problems identified included:   
“I cannot take all my quota” 
“Will not work because the small quota on Whiting would stop you fishing within 
weeks” 
“Unworkable – impossible to stop fishing when one species is caught” 
“Lack of Cod quota and the cost of renting quota” 
“Most would be forced to sell up or go bankrupt” 
“Lack of quota for certain species - Hake and Coley” 
“Unworkable - impossible to stop fishing when one species caught” 
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“Cannot stop fishing when one species is caught” 
 
Respondents also indicated that the perceived abundance of Cod caused problems in terms of meeting 
or exceeding their quotas.   
 
“It’s impossible to fish and avoid Cod due to their abundance” 
“There has always been a dominant species, - trying to regulate the fishery on 
one species will always result in abuse and discards of the dominant species” 
When asked about benefits of the approach respondents also focused on the quota issue: 
 
“Vessels with high quota will be able to fish as they should those that have no quota will have 
to stop fishing sooner” 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in long term will reduce leasing costs” 
“Vessels that have quota will be able to fish as they should be , those that have no quota and 
most of the discards will have to stop fishing sooner” 
 
The views provided by the respondents suggests that those who had adequate quota would be better off 
under this management approach, but those with low quota would suffer, because as soon as their 
quota for a species was used up they would have to tie up.  The nature of the on-line questionnaire 
suggests that some of the respondents picked up on this particular aspect of the proposed approach and 
it strongly influenced their opinion. 
 
What is interesting from the responses received is the level of support for particular implementation 
techniques.  There appears to be general support for activities such as banking and borrowing from one 
year to the next, and for CCTV.  Examples of responses include: 
 
“CCTV is very good on reducing Cod discards and making the skipper think where to fish and 
with what size” 
“Reducing discards and getting extra quota in the long term will reduce leasing costs. In favour 
of expanding CCTV to certain boats/species” 
“Banking and borrowing with a 15% limit” 
“Banking and borrowing is a good idea” 
 
In terms of ease of enforcement the majority of respondents felt that Option 1 (closest to the current 
situation) would be easiest to enforce, and Option 2 the most difficult.  Respondents were equally 
divided over the ease with which Options 3 and 4 could be implemented with half thinking they would 
be easier and half thinking they would be more difficult.   
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Table 1:  Perception of impacts on activities 
 
 
 
Summary 
The views of fishermen are based on a very small sample, and the management options presented 
range from the known and familiar (Option 1) to the unfamiliar (Option 4), which would undoubtedly 
influence perceptions.  Option 4 (real time incentives), which is the least familiar is the most difficult 
to interpret with no clear set of views emerging.  This might be due to lack of familiarity with the ideas 
presented.  Option 3 is the least preferred and appears to have the highest perceived negative financial 
impacts.   
 
A major focus of respondents throughout all management approaches was on quota and a perception of 
relative Cod abundance.  Respondents with enough quota suggest that Options 2 and 3 would be less 
damaging than those with limited quota, who see option 3 in particular as restricting their fishing 
opportunities.  The main negative impacts for Options 2, and 3 apply to the following activities: 
• Managing my fishing effort 
• Controlling costs 
• Managing my Cod quota 
• Managing my quota for other species  
• Reducing discards of Cod 
Activities least impact by the proposed measures relate to:  
• Using my knowledge and judgement about when and where to fish 
• Fish safely  
• Adapting my effort to the weather and other environmental conditions 
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There is support for implementation actions such as CCTV and banking/borrowing from one year to 
the next.  
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challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and
sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food 
security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security
including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
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The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) has been established by the
European Commission. The STECF is being consulted at regular intervals on matters pertaining to the 
conservation and management of living aquatic resources, including biological, economic,
environmental, social and technical considerations. 
 
